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This report reviews policy developments and 
evidence on the devolution of welfare to work 
policies in Britain, Canada, the USA, the Netherlands 
and Germany, and analyses proposals for further 
devolution in England.
Welfare to work devolution could play a critical role in the translation of 
growth-related increased economic activity into improved jobs and incomes 
for poorer residents in disadvantaged areas. 
The report finds that: 
•	 In other countries, the devolution of welfare to work spurred local actors 
to integrate the delivery of employment, training and other services and 
to improve performance. 
•	 Devolution of the Work Programme (WP) and other welfare to work 
services should be tailored to local governance capacity and should be an 
explicit aim of City and Growth Deals, rather than a tacit local objective.
•	 There should be further devolution of the working relationship between 
Jobcentres and local government and more coherent partnership 
agreements to help facilitate integrated service delivery. 
•	 Central accountability and greater local control can be aligned through 
negotiated agreements, performance reporting systems, and the 
incentives and sanctions embedded in conditional central funding such as 
block grants and black box contracts. 
•	 Variation in service delivery should be accommodated but welfare to 
work devolution must be underpinned by transparent national minimum 
standards, especially where participation is mandatory.
•	 Performance requirements should help shape devolution in ways that 
are likely to contribute to poverty reduction, and future welfare to work 
provision should reward job entry, retention and progression rather than 
only caseload reduction.
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ExECUTivE SUmmARY
This report considers the devolution of welfare to 
work policies in Britain and in selected comparator 
countries and reviews proposals for further 
devolution in England.  
The governance of the British welfare to work system is highly centralised 
and, in comparative terms, the benefits, employment services and 
skills system is characterised by prescriptive national programmes and 
administrative processes. Despite some variation in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales, UK ministers and senior civil servants in Whitehall 
continue to control the main levers of welfare to work policy and, in contrast 
to most other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, local government plays only a limited role.
There has been much criticism of these institutional arrangements, 
the fragmentation of public sector delivery, and the lack of flexibility and 
devolution in the welfare to work system. Such criticisms have suggested 
that greater local control and flexibility would enable local government and/
or employer-led partnerships to improve policy effectiveness, increase 
value for money and better adapt ‘mainstream’ policies, especially the Work 
Programme, to local conditions. 
Central control and local delivery of British welfare to 
work programmes
Central control of the welfare to work system has been tempered by 
successive efforts by British governments to better align strong national 
departmental control with different types of local flexibility and partnership 
working. Successive reforms to governance and funding arrangements 
included the introduction of early area advisory bodies in 1983, their 
replacement by devolved employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils 
(TECs), and subsequent efforts to secure improved co-ordination of welfare 
to work programmes with other local provision through varied forms of 
multi-agency partnerships. The reforms aimed, to a greater or lesser extent, 
to encourage different public agencies and employers, especially local 
authorities and Jobcentre Plus, to develop joint plans, align budgets, and 
tackle unemployment and worklessness. 
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The policy experiences from these periods reveal tensions at the heart of 
localising welfare to work policies. It is contended that centrally prescribed 
programmes and contracts have continued to restrict the capacity of 
providers and partners to tailor service delivery to local circumstances 
and priorities. Explicit devolution reforms and more or less complex pilots 
offering greater flexibility often have been short-lived. The case for greater 
devolution has increased, however, because of the limited success of 
mainstream welfare to work provision, the scale and complexity of tackling 
worklessness, public expenditure cuts, and the pivotal contribution that 
integrated employment and skills provision can make to economic growth 
and to enabling local residents access to better-quality employment. At the 
same time, the significance of local government involvement has increased, 
reflecting its role in delivering employment, skills and related services 
and in economic development and area regeneration. Local government 
involvement gives greater legitimacy to often controversial national welfare 
to work programmes and may provide greater insight into how to tailor 
services to the needs and views of local communities.
The Coalition Government and welfare to work 
devolution
The approach of the Coalition Government to welfare to work devolution 
has been mixed. Growth Deals, City Deals and Community Budgets 
are innovations in the empowerment of Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) and local authorities to analyse their areas, identify priorities 
and develop approaches with the potential to better co-ordinate 
fragmented employment and skills services, and improve outcomes and 
cost effectiveness. In practice, however, such negotiated deals represent 
a comparatively weak type of devolution, with critics noting that local 
stakeholders must ‘prove’ each of their propositions in a series of bilateral 
negotiations with individual departments and agencies while government 
retains the preponderance of powers, resources, flexibilities and influence. 
Implementation has barely started and it remains to be seen whether the 
highly conditional commitments given by ministers, the Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP) and other central government departments, translate 
into more flexible and targeted front-line service delivery.
A narrow approach to devolution appears particularly strong within 
the DWP, which has continued a strong ‘centralised’ approach to localism. 
Local flexibility given to Jobcentres and co-operation with LEPs has been 
organised in ways designed to secure national departmental targets and 
meet what DWP regards as its distinctive accountability for public funds. 
More extensive flexibility has been extended only through national black box 
payment-by-results programmes delivered by prime providers. Ministers 
and Whitehall appear reluctant to relax control and there appears to be 
scepticism about the capacity of local agencies to design employment 
services and commission them in ways that are transparent, avoid high 
transaction costs and improve employment outcomes. The DWP is 
concerned in particular that national ‘work first’ priorities should not be 
undermined by divergent local interests and/or capabilities and this has 
constrained local integration and partnership working. Flexibility is intended 
to complement mainstream services, and joint working largely concerns 
provision for those workless people who are not covered or are poorly 
served by mainstream programmes.
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Welfare to work devolution in other countries
This report reviews experience from other countries where there has been 
a strong trend towards the decentralisation of welfare to work provision 
alongside the development of ‘work first’ systems intended to assist benefit 
claimants into jobs. It considers devolution reforms in four countries cited 
frequently in recent UK literature – Canada, the USA, the Netherlands 
and Germany – where different approaches have driven inter-institutional 
collaboration, especially between the Public Employment Service (PES) and 
lower tiers of government. Decentralisation reforms have been associated 
with other public management trends, and in each of the countries there 
has been significant national and local change in contracting out important 
aspects of the system, including case management, employment support 
and skills services and, in some US states, eligibility determination. The new 
systems have also seen increased reliance on performance management for 
ensuring accountability in decentralised and privatised systems. Each case 
study gives insight into policy design, funding frameworks and performance 
management, and considers findings on the impact of devolution reforms on 
the delivery and integration of front-line services. 
It is difficult to disentangle particular impacts of governance reforms, 
but evaluations suggest that in the comparator countries devolution acted 
as the catalyst around which lower tiers of government and local actors 
sought to integrate the delivery of employment, training and other services. 
The process of integration required significant investment of time and 
resources, at least initially, with a sharp and continuous learning curve for 
administrators and providers. Over time, however, evidence suggests well-
managed devolution improved performance, encouraged innovation and 
enabled local actors to design and provide services better tailored to the 
needs of local communities and employers.
Proposals for further welfare to work devolution in 
England 
In the past two years, there has been a plethora of reports from local 
government organisations, think tanks and some academics outlining a 
diverse range of proposals for further welfare to work devolution. Many of 
the proposed reforms, especially from local government stakeholders, are 
focused on future devolution of the Work Programme, but some think tanks 
and other organisations propose also that, apart from benefit administration 
and claimant profiling, all employment services provision should be 
contracted out, as occurs in Australia. A few voices have called explicitly for 
Jobcentre privatisation and for lower tiers of government to be able to vary 
benefit conditionality and set differential benefit rates.
The proposals from local government stakeholders typically suggest that 
some or all DWP employment programmes and national skills programmes 
be devolved and commissioned on the basis of LEP boundaries or those 
of combined local authorities. This would have several advantages. It would 
facilitate ‘pooling’ of fragmented budgets and data sharing. It would align 
provision with functional economic areas promoting connections between 
welfare to work services and local growth strategies, facilitating partnership 
working with local government, skills and other service providers. For DWP 
programmes, the increase in the number of areas and the reduction in 
the size of contracts also would open up the mainstream welfare to work 
delivery market to a potentially more diverse group of providers. 
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The Conservative and Liberal Democrat Parties have not yet made their 
position clear but the Labour Party has committed, if elected, to devolve 
the WP and skills budgets to LEPs and city-county regions. Any such 
devolution will overlap with more co-working between local government and 
Jobcentres as they implement Universal Credit (UC)-related employment-
focused local support services.
The challenges and opportunities associated with welfare 
to work devolution
Service delivery improvements may be achieved in decentralised settings 
but the success of welfare to work devolution relies on managing critical 
challenges.
The first issue concerns accountability. Welfare to work policies have 
national significance, and central government is accountable for setting 
priorities, providing resources and managing unemployment and welfare 
caseloads. National objectives often are the basis for negotiated agreements 
and targets with lower tiers of government and, as in the USA or Canada, 
may be monitored and managed through performance reporting systems; 
central or regional scrutiny and evaluation; and the incentives and sanctions 
embedded in conditional central funding. Such mechanisms are important 
to mitigate the potential for misaligned or conflicting incentives, especially 
the risk that in multi-tiered policy systems some levels may have strong 
incentives to shift costs and resist central reform. 
The design of funding and performance reporting mechanisms is critical 
for accountability. Funding proposals for devolving welfare to work services 
in England vary. Most suggest that where local councils and partnerships 
become responsible for particular claimant groups, especially the most 
disadvantaged, they should offer higher performance and, by investing some 
of their own resources, assume greater financial risk for service delivery. 
The most radical propose that, in return, local areas would receive a share 
of the central benefit expenditure saved. Such an approach is analogous to 
block grant and black box funding, which give lower tiers of government 
or providers flexibility and incentives to increase efficiency, and have been 
associated with reduced welfare caseloads. In contrast to Canada and the 
USA, the block grant model in the Netherlands illustrates how devolution, 
local flexibility and caseload reductions may be secured while retaining 
strong national benefit entitlements. Other mechanisms – such as the 
maintenance of effort requirement in USA welfare funding – may also 
counter local pressures to reduce provision and ensure that central funding 
is not simply used to substitute for existing investment.
National funding systems and performance requirements may also help 
shape delivery in ways more likely to contribute to poverty reduction by, for 
example, focusing on the quality as well as the duration of the employment 
gained as in the earnings and hours measures tracked in the US workforce 
development system. 
A further issue concerns the potential for fragmentation and the 
development of more effective ways of securing local co-operation. The 
Community Budget approach, if implemented, may meet the need for 
greater flexibility in national departmental performance and budgetary 
frameworks. This should help foster co-operation among a range of 
relevant actors providing training, social and health services, local economic 
development and employment. One significant outcome should be improved 
service delivery through co-ordination and/or co-location. 
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Little attention has been given to devolution of the Jobcentre network 
even though it remains the dominant provider of local welfare to work 
services. The role of Jobcentres is changing rapidly but there are marked 
variations in how DWP districts and individual Jobcentres engage with 
partnerships, councils and contracted providers. The development of 
UC-related local support services requires greater partnership working 
by Jobcentres, and local authorities are likely to seek better integration 
of employment and benefits advice services. Greater devolution of how 
Jobcentres work with local government is required and more coherent 
partnership agreements would help facilitate integrated and locally 
accountable service delivery. 
A further challenge concerns differential management and delivery 
capacity. Designing devolution must consider the personnel; organisational 
and fiscal capabilities of local authorities; and, at least initially, the centre 
should facilitate capacity building, evaluation and transfer of best practice. 
The differential Canadian approach to Labour Market Agreements (LMAs) 
and the US use of state-based waivers, allowed provincial and state 
governments to negotiate different levels of responsibility and to test, 
evaluate and develop new approaches to local design and delivery before 
moving to fuller devolution. 
Devolution proposals for England recognise that local administrative 
and governance capacity varies, and proponents typically suggest a staged 
approach to reform which would offer local partnerships different levels 
of devolution according to their appetite for change and their capacity to 
deliver and to assume risk. Such a differentiated and experimental approach 
should be an explicit national policy for City and Growth Deals, rather than 
a tacit local objective, thereby helping to establish a clearer pathway for the 
further devolution of welfare to work policies in England.
A final challenge concerns equity. There is a potential conflict between 
the norm of equal treatment and the devolution of employment services 
and benefit entitlements. This has emerged in the UK with the patchwork 
of varied support systems that local authorities have established in place of 
Council Tax Benefit and local emergency welfare assistance. The key issue 
in publicly and privately delivered welfare to work services is the extent to 
which variety can be accommodated while ensuring common or minimum 
service standards for eligible participants. There also should be some 
regulatory oversight for ensuring that local services promote job entry, 
retention and progression rather than simple caseload reduction. 
Equity concerns also should be reflected in the design of the budgetary 
mechanisms through which national resources are allocated to and targeted 
at local areas and should be commensurate with levels of unemployment 
and disadvantage, including poverty rates. The lessons from welfare to work 
devolution in the comparator countries (and from UK experience) highlight 
the importance of budgetary systems that balance performance-related 
incentives and sanctions with the necessity for maintaining investment in and 
provision of support for service users, especially in areas with weak labour 
markets. Funding formulas need to protect against abrupt changes in local 
allocations, militate against any ‘race to the bottom’ and provide for the 
impact of ‘economic shocks’.
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1 inTRODUCTiOn
In the past three decades the British welfare state 
has changed radically. Recent governments have 
shared a common aim to create a ‘work first’ benefit 
regime with policies that ‘make work pay’. 
The rights and responsibilities of most working-age adults receiving out-
of-work benefits have been redefined and work-related conditionality has 
been extended to cover a more diverse group of claimants, including lone 
parents, partners and people with disabilities and/or health-related problems. 
Welfare to work policies have been coupled with organisational reforms that 
have greatly altered the national agencies and contracted service providers 
responsible for delivering and administering cash benefits and employment 
services.
Welfare to work reform is linked to the parallel debate on how the 
benefits of economic growth could be more evenly distributed. New 
institutional arrangements have been introduced to drive local growth 
strategies, especially in England, where a national network of some 39 
employer-led partnerships has been established. It is not yet clear, however, 
how Local Enterprise Partnerships, and related City Deals and Growth Deals, 
will align with mainstream welfare to work policies or how greater economic 
growth will contribute to poverty reduction. 
Welfare to work policies will play a critical role in the translation of 
growth-related increased economic activity into employment, incomes and 
opportunities for poorer residents in disadvantaged areas. The poverty-
reduction effects of growth strategies will depend on two key factors. 
The first concerns the quality of employment created, including the level 
of work-related income paid, the hours and conditions of work, and the 
duration of jobs. The second concerns the effectiveness of the welfare 
to work, employment and training measures in place to ensure that poor 
residents have the opportunity to prepare for, obtain and retain jobs 
and to make income progression once they have obtained employment. 
Comparative studies suggest that greater flexibility and control of services 
would enable local actors to better tackle the problems associated with low 
productivity jobs and in-work poverty and develop more effective provision 
for groups with more complex disadvantages (Froy, et al., 2011; Froy and 
Giguère, 2010; Potter, 2008). 
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Despite reforms, the British welfare to work policy and delivery 
system remain some of the most centralised in the OECD (Mosley, 2012; 
Weishaupt, 2011). In the absence of a written constitution and fewer 
restraints on the executive, the government has an enhanced capacity 
to redesign benefits and programmes, create organisations and mould 
institutions to meet its policy objectives. The design and delivery of cash 
benefits for all British citizens is largely centralised and employment 
services are mainly controlled centrally and delivered through the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP) network of Jobcentres and 
contracted providers.1 In England, skills policy is largely the responsibility 
of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), with national 
programme budgets distributed to colleges and training providers by several 
national agencies. Skills budgets are devolved to Scotland and Wales but 
skills policy remains centrally managed by each country’s administration. 
There are contending views on the effectiveness of UK welfare to work 
policies and related employment services and training programmes and 
their contribution to poverty reduction. There has been much debate on 
how to improve the effectiveness of Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and the Work 
Programme, and their capacity to place, sustain and progress benefit 
claimants into better-quality employment (WPC, 2013; 2014). There has 
been criticism of the highly centralised British system and growing interest 
in how welfare to work devolution might improve performance through 
more effective integration of employment and skills programmes and wider 
support services. Proponents of reform suggest that devolution and greater 
flexibility in national programmes would enable local government and/or 
other partnerships to improve policy effectiveness, value for money and 
better adapt mainstream policies to local conditions (Key Cities, 2014; CCN, 
2014; Peace Commission, 2014; Core Cities, 2013; London Councils, 2013; 
LGA, 2013). 
In this context, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) commissioned 
this report to review the local dimension of welfare to work reforms and 
proposals specifically for further devolution in England. The report reviews 
many developments concerning British welfare to work policies and while 
the focus is on England many of the findings are relevant to arrangements in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The research project is part of the JRF’s wider Cities, Growth and 
Poverty programme, which considers how people in poverty may benefit 
from economic growth in city-regions, including how poor people can be 
linked to newly created jobs. This report complements the findings from 
two companion reviews, one of which comprises an evidence review of 
local-level approaches to connecting the unemployed to better jobs; the 
other assesses the devolution and alignment of skills provision in cities (City 
Growth Commission, 2014). 
The research 
This study reviews research findings on the devolution of welfare to work 
policies in Britain and in selected comparator countries. It reviews previous 
efforts to devolve welfare to work provision in England and how such 
reforms sought to align incentives for and manage the tension between 
central and local priorities. The report considers the following issues:
•	 the aspects of welfare to work that have been decentralised and on what 
geographic scale;
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•	 the different approaches that have been proposed and tested, including 
local oversight, co-commissioning, and local commissioning;
•	 the changes that have been made at the centre to support welfare to 
work devolution including, for example, changes in the structure of DWP 
contracts, the management of JCP, and the role of other departments;
•	 the different options for funding decentralised welfare that have been 
proposed and tested, including, for example, central block grants, 
incentive payments and payment-by-results (PbR); and
•	 how reform efforts have sought to balance accountability for performance 
and equity in service delivery and which mechanisms may be needed to 
protect weak labour markets and/or areas with small populations should 
further devolution occur.
The research for this study combined a targeted review of official reports 
and evaluations, independent studies and peer-reviewed research, 
concerning welfare to work devolution. It included a small number of 
interviews with key stakeholders, including representatives from DWP, 
local government, and welfare to work providers. The report also draws 
on findings from earlier comparative research and country case studies 
undertaken by the author. 
What is devolution and what is devolved?
International reviews, such as those published by the World Bank,2 use the 
terms devolution and decentralisation interchangeably, but they typically 
concern assessments of several distinct governance reforms which are 
each at play in contemporary UK welfare to work policy. The first element 
concerns what may be characterised as managerial or administrative 
decentralisation, in which national agencies, such as the DWP, give 
local managers increased operational flexibility in implementing central 
policy objectives. The second element may be characterised as economic 
decentralisation, through which the national government, as in Australia 
and Britain, enters into contracts with private and voluntary-sector 
agencies that may have greater discretion in how they deliver employment 
services previously delivered by the public sector. Finally, there is political 
decentralisation or devolution, under which specified policy authority and 
resources are transferred to lower, more autonomous tiers of government, 
which then can play a more significant role in welfare to work design, 
implementation and, in some countries, policy formation. 
Comparative reviews of decentralisation reveal a wide variety of reforms 
through which a range of powers and resources have been devolved to 
different tiers of government. The studies that specifically consider welfare 
to work, employment and skills, and economic development point to the 
following aspects of policy and/or delivery that have been devolved in 
varying ways in different countries:
•	 budget flexibility (e.g., funding from block grants; ability to move funds 
between budgets; retention of surpluses; performance penalties and 
bonuses);
•	 benefit design, including the freedom to determine or vary eligibility rules, 
payment levels, sanctions and delivery methods;
•	 ability to design local services or adapt national programmes, rules and 
target groups to local needs;
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•	 organisation of service delivery and recruitment and management of 
personnel; and
•	 contract design and subcontracting with providers.
International evidence reviews on the impact of such reforms on public 
services frequently report a paucity of empirical research, with the findings 
available often revealing ambiguous and contradictory findings (Weishaupt, 
2014; Mosley, 2012; Tomaney, et al., 2011; Atkinson, 2010; Scott, 2009; 
Robinson, 2007). The reviews indicate that the effects of decentralisation 
are shaped by policy aims, design, context and implementation, and must 
be analysed within the political context in which they are implemented. 
The cumulative findings suggest that academics and experts are only at the 
stage of ‘clarifying links between decentralisation, service delivery, economic 
development and social cohesion’ (Scott, 2009, p. 5).
This review assesses findings from primarily descriptive studies of how 
different decentralisation processes have helped shape the delivery of British 
welfare to work policies. It also makes use of the limited findings available 
on the impacts attributable to such reforms. The study further reviews the 
findings available in the case-study countries where the implementation 
of welfare to work devolution has been subject to greater assessment and 
evaluation. 
The report
The first substantive chapter of this report considers the development of the 
welfare to work system in England and the different ways in which previous 
governments have sought to decentralise and align the national employment 
services system with other programmes targeted at promoting economic 
growth and regenerating deprived areas. This chapter gives historical insight 
into how the tensions between central welfare to work programmes and 
local delivery have previously been managed. It outlines the institutional 
context and delivery landscape which emerged and within which current 
welfare to work and devolution reforms are being implemented. Readers 
concerned only with recent policy developments are advised to start with 
the subsequent chapter and then go to the conclusion. 
The second substantive chapter considers the relationships between, 
and alignment of, the Coalition Government’s welfare to work reforms with 
local growth strategies. It reviews the delivery of employment services and 
the local impact of Universal Credit and related benefit changes. It reviews 
the employment services and skills aspects of City Deals and Growth Deals 
which local authorities and LEPs have negotiated with central government. 
The deals are putting in place local delivery arrangements that test new ways 
in which employment, skills and support services can be combined, especially 
for people on disability benefits. The results from these local approaches 
could help shape the future design and delivery of the welfare to work 
system. 
The third chapter reviews other national approaches, with a particular 
focus on the devolution of powers over employment services and cash 
benefits to regional and local government. It reviews how four selected 
comparator countries – Canada, the USA, the Netherlands and Germany 
– have devolved aspects of welfare to work policy and promoted inter-
institutional collaboration, especially between the Public Employment 
Service and local government. 
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A final chapter assesses how welfare to work policies in England could be 
further devolved and considers what features and safeguards are needed to 
ensure that such devolution is effective and better contributes to poverty 
reduction. 
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2 WElFARE TO 
WORK DEvOlUTiOn 
in EnGlAnD BEFORE 
2010
This chapter reviews the design of the welfare to 
work system in England and the different ways in 
which previous governments sought to decentralise 
and align welfare to work programmes with other 
programmes targeted at deprived areas. 
The chapter briefly assesses the transition from the large-scale employment 
and training programmes delivered through the corporatist Manpower 
Services Commission (MSC) and the subsequent devolved delivery of such 
programmes through area-based employer-led TECs. It considers in more 
detail how the previous Labour Government sought to devolve aspects of 
welfare to work policy delivery in the New Deals and later City Strategy 
Pathfinders alongside the development of the prime contractor welfare to 
work delivery market. 
This chapter considers also the role of local partnerships and target 
setting systems that aimed, to a greater or lesser extent, to encourage 
different public agencies, especially local authorities and JCP, to develop 
joint plans, pool budgets, and tackle unemployment and worklessness in 
disadvantaged areas. This period saw the development of organisational 
processes, funding systems and differentiated governance approaches which 
have helped shape current collaboration and co-ordination between local 
government and the welfare to work delivery system. 
The centralisation of the British welfare to work system
The high degree of centralisation in the British social security system stems 
in part from the legacy of nineteenth-century Poor Laws and the system of 
‘outdoor relief’. In the first half of the twentieth century, less stigmatising 
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institutional arrangements were gradually put in place to provide income 
protection for some of the unemployed, but many of the long-term 
unemployed and other workless families relied on means-tested support 
and ‘relief’. The key modernising elements included the introduction and 
gradual extension of a centralised Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, 
its administration through a national network of Labour Exchanges and, 
in 1934, the transfer of responsibility for means-tested Unemployment 
Assistance benefits to the Unemployment (later National) Assistance Board. 
The Public Assistance Committees of local authorities had direct 
responsibility for the means-tested ‘relief’ system for a short period after 
the abolition of separately elected Poor Law Boards in 1929. There was 
almost immediate controversy about local variation in means testing and the 
treatment of the unemployed, with councils often applying harsh approaches 
that had previously made the Poor Law system so unpopular. In some areas 
councillors and officials were sympathetic to the unemployed and/or were 
under pressure from local campaigns. At the same time, in the 1930s era 
of austerity, local areas faced pressure from central government to restrict 
benefit levels and apply rigorous means tests. This led to political conflict 
and contributed to Prime Minister Chamberlain’s decision to ‘depoliticise’ 
the issue of unemployment relief and take it out of the hands of local 
government (Stevenson, 1984). 
This early centralisation of the UK benefit system had longer-term 
significance in signalling the responsibility of central government for 
provision of a national and uniform minimum subsistence income, initially 
only for the unemployed ‘but destined to play a fundamental role in the 
postwar development of the British welfare state’ (Lynes, 2011, p. 232). 
This contrasts markedly with the experience of most other OECD countries, 
where local government retains responsibility for administering and often 
partial financing of means-tested social assistance for working-age people.
Since 1945, the British benefit system has been characterised by national 
contributory benefits for the insured and means-tested benefits for those 
ineligible for insurance benefits. Since the 1980s, coverage of insurance-
based benefits for people of working age has declined significantly and 
payment levels have been aligned with their means-tested equivalents. 
Until recently, there has been little variation in benefit entitlements, 
although Housing and Council Tax Benefits, which are administered by local 
authorities, reflect varying local costs.
The British employment services and skills system also has been 
characterised by highly prescriptive national processes and programmes. The 
centralisation of the system was tempered by the existence of local advisory 
mechanisms and, from the 1980s, by successive efforts to better align 
employment and training programmes with other services to meet the needs 
of local employers and communities. These reforms created the institutional 
settings for contemporary devolution reforms.
The manpower Services Commission and devolution to 
employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils 
Post-war local Employment Committees had little direct influence on the 
delivery of employment services until 1983, when they were reconstituted 
as Area Manpower Boards (AMBs). In this era the ‘corporatist’ Manpower 
Services Commission (MSC), responsible for apprenticeships and work-based 
skills policy, grew into a major public sector agency, largely due to its position 
as the main response mechanism to rapidly rising youth and long-term adult 
unemployment. 
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Concerns about any 
weakening of the 
link between benefit 
administration and job-
search requirements 
have since been a major 
factor limiting local 
initiatives perceived 
to be undermining 
the ‘work first’ benefit 
regime.
Welfare to work devolution in England before 2010
The MSC was a statutory national body established by the Employment 
and Training Act (1973) and responsible to the Secretary of State for 
Employment for the co-ordination and management of the public 
employment and training system. It comprised an equal number of employer 
and trade-union representatives, with minority representation from local 
government and the voluntary sector. The MSC was supported and staffed 
by civil servants and operated through a public sector network of regional, 
district and local offices. It was tasked with modernising the employment 
and training system, which most visibly included the development of a new 
national network of high-street Jobcentres designed to deliver labour 
market services for all employers and job seekers, including the unemployed. 
The MSC had no direct responsibility for unemployment benefits, which 
continued to be delivered by the Department of Employment (DE) through a 
national network of Unemployment Benefit Offices (UBOs). 
The composition of the local AMBs reflected that of the corporatist 
national MSC, with minority local government and voluntary-sector 
representation. Between 1983 and 1987, 54 AMBs played a key role in the 
approval and implementation of large-scale and controversial training and 
temporary employment programmes. The presence of local government on 
the Boards was significant. It reflected the growing role local authorities had 
in delivering training and employment schemes for the most disadvantaged, 
and it gave local democratic legitimacy for the MSC with local government 
AMB members, providing insights into the needs and views of local 
communities (Fullick, 1986).
The MSC’s responsibility for Jobcentres brought it into conflict with 
central government because it was often critical of the Department of 
Employment’s gradual introduction of a ‘stricter benefit regime’. In the 
1980s, the administrative link between job search and benefit receipt 
had weakened significantly and there was evidence that increased 
unemployment durations were partly attributable to lax implementation of 
benefit conditionality and weak front-line connections between UBOs and 
Jobcentres (Wells, 2001). Consequently, the government embarked on 
‘work first’ reforms, which included more explicit job-search requirements 
for the unemployed, increased sanctions and mandatory participation in 
some programmes. More expensive training and employment programmes 
were replaced by less costly job-search assistance, and central controls were 
imposed on the employment services system to ensure it implemented and 
monitored increased benefit conditionality. Ministerial and departmental 
concerns about any weakening of the link between benefit administration 
and job-search requirements have since been a major factor limiting local 
initiatives perceived to be undermining the ‘work first’ benefit regime.
In the late 1980s, there was significant change. The MSC was abolished 
after conflict between the government and the Trades Union Congress 
over the introduction of compulsory training programmes. In 1987 the 
government created a unified Employment Service (ES), centralising and 
merging the previously separate network of Jobcentres and UBOs. In 
contrast, training programmes for the young and long-term unemployed 
were decentralised to a network of 82 employer-led Training and Enterprise 
Councils in England and Wales, and 22 Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) in 
Scotland.3 
The TECs were incorporated as private companies, with an employer 
chair and a two-thirds employer majority. They were allocated significant 
budgets and were designed to facilitate a leading role for employers in the 
local design and delivery of training, enterprise and economic development. 
Their ten-year existence, however, was marred by constant friction over 
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the degree of central control over their activities. The relationship of the 
TECs with central government was based on formal contracts, operating 
agreements and performance targets negotiated annually with the national 
Department of Employment. Instead of the strategic autonomy and flexibility 
they thought they would enjoy, the TECs found that ministers and the DE 
treated them primarily as a delivery mechanism. One detailed evaluation of 
the experience of TECs concluded that the ‘structure represents a single 
system in which responsibility has been devolved without an equivalent 
decentralisation of power’ (Bennett, et al., 1994, p. 112).
TECs did not directly deliver services but acted as area-based prime 
contractors. They had flexibility in some of the services they procured and 
the prices paid but their contracts with providers had to reflect detailed 
eligibility and operating specifications documented in their own contracts 
with the DE. By 1994, there was pressure to cut costs and variation in TEC 
pricing strategies, with providers increasingly paid for qualifications and jobs 
secured. It was reported that the viability of specialist voluntary and public 
sector providers, which continued to work with harder-to-place participants, 
was undermined (ESC, 1996, p. xi).
TECs had some flexibility over their budgets including a limited ability 
to vire funds between programmes and the capacity to generate surpluses, 
although these had to be spent in meeting wider TEC objectives. In addition, 
TECs were given a smaller allocation for a Local Initiative Fund, often used 
in part for targeted provision for particular groups including, for example, 
minority communities or otherwise harder-to-help populations.
There are mixed reviews of TEC performance and the impact of their 
programmes (for reviews, see Jones, 1999; Bennet, et al., 1994). There was 
controversy about the funding system and, over time, the focus of youth and 
adult training shifted towards lower-cost provision. There were differences 
in how each TEC determined its priorities, with some attaching little 
importance to special-needs training. The outcome was significant variation 
in the availability and adequacy of provision for the most disadvantaged, 
even in neighbouring areas. Given the political controversies that emerged, 
many TEC directors themselves felt ‘under siege’ on these issues, subject to 
conflicting demands and pressures from different interest groups on the one 
hand and conflicting or ambiguous requirements from the DE on the other 
(Meager, 1995; ESC, 1996).
Following the change in government in 1997, TECs continued to 
deliver services but a 1999 white paper criticised the ‘complex funding, 
administration and contracting system for TECs’ (DfEE, 1999, p. 19). The 
white paper announced that TEC operating licences would end in April 2001 
and that central control would be re-established through a national Learning 
and Skills Council (LSC), which was given responsibility for distributing 
funding for all post-compulsory school-age education and training (apart 
from Higher Education).
Regeneration policy, partnerships and the Single 
Regeneration Budget
During the 1980s, the design and delivery of urban and inner-city 
regeneration policy was transformed. This involved a phase of centralisation, 
with the gradual transfer of powers and finance from local to central 
government, and responsibilities transferred also to a plethora of centrally 
appointed employer-led bodies such as Urban Development Corporations. 
Following this period, characterised by political conflict between the 
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Thatcher Government and Labour-led local authorities, a more co-operative 
phase emerged in the early 1990s. This was to lead to new institutional 
arrangements with multi-agency partnerships seeking to align and pool the 
budgets of different public agencies. This approach has been a mainstay of 
successive efforts through which central government has sought to reduce 
policy fragmentation, increase flexibility and tackle local deprivation. 
Following a series of reviews in the late 1980s, urban policy shifted from 
a narrow focus on property-based interventions towards an emphasis on 
the needs of disadvantaged groups and individuals at the local level (see, 
for example, Audit Commission, 1989). These reviews highlighted the lack 
of co-ordination in central government policy, the limitations of private 
sector-led agencies, the fragmentation of the public sector and the absence 
of effective community involvement. The response was the introduction of 
City Challenge in 1991 and later of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 
Challenge in England, with parallel initiatives in Wales and Scotland. The 
new approach developed by then Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Michael Heseltine, departed from the reactive, project-driven approach of 
the previous decade.4 
City Challenge established a process that involved three principles which 
have since been central to many regeneration programmes and efforts to 
decentralise welfare to work. Partnership working would establish common 
aims and help reduce fragmentation. Where budgets could not be pooled, 
agencies would seek alignment with mainstream programmes so that 
they complemented partnership efforts and were more focused on local 
needs. Devolution was to be accompanied also by competition, intended to 
encourage innovation with any best practice identified and transferred or 
adapted for other areas.
City Challenge laid the ground for the Single Regeneration Budget, 
which was to be the main source of support for local area regeneration in 
England between 1995 and 2001 (Rhodes, et al., 2007). The SRB brought 
together 20 separate programmes into a single budget with the intention of 
promoting a more flexible response to urban problems. There were several 
competitive rounds of SRB bids and each proposed plan had to address key 
themes, including unemployment, and be supported by an inclusive cross-
sectoral partnership.5
Once an SRB partnership secured funding, it was responsible for the 
management and operation of the scheme, reporting on a six-monthly basis 
to Government Offices for the Regions in the early years and subsequently 
to the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The new delivery 
partnerships usually were formally constituted as trusts or limited companies 
and had a management board on which a wide range of partner interests 
were represented, a tighter executive committee of core partners and a full-
time partnership team (Geddes, 1997). 
The new approach to tackling regeneration and unemployment 
through partnership working was reinforced by developments in European 
Commission funding which stressed partnership bidding, requiring local 
authorities, TECs and other private-sector interests and the voluntary 
sector, to work together on local strategies for tackling unemployment 
and exclusion. The ability of local authorities and TECs to match their own 
public funds with the European Social Fund in particular gave them some 
genuine autonomy. This flexibility was used to support a broad range of 
local and non-governmental organisations to provide small-scale training 
and employment initiatives working with women and lone parents, refugees, 
ethnic minorities, the homeless and the young and long-term unemployed. 
Many of these organisations appeared to secure impressive job entry and 
progression rates (Turok and Webster, 1998, p. 324). 
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Despite central efforts 
to promote partnership, 
working departments 
such as the DWP 
continued to give 
priority to their own 
more narrowly defined 
objectives, and seemed 
unwilling or unable to 
share information and 
knowledge with local 
partners.
The national Strategy for neighbourhood Renewal, local 
Strategic Partnerships and Area Agreements
The election of the Labour Government in 1997 led to changes in 
regeneration policy, funding and institutional arrangements, although 
partnership working remained central to the delivery system. Control of 
SRB was given to RDAs and from 2002–03 several funding streams were 
combined into a ‘single funding pot’. Among other priorities, the RDAs 
had to target their most deprived wards and were free to fund SRB-type 
programmes should they so choose. The government also introduced a more 
targeted and longer-term New Deal for Communities (NDC) in 1998–9. 
Local NDC partnerships developed ten-year plans to ‘turn round’ the 
prospects of 39 severely deprived areas across the country, each comprising 
about 10,000 residents (Batty, et al., 2010). 
Further systemic change was announced in 2001 following publication of 
the ‘National Strategy Action Plan’ for Neighbourhood Renewal (CO, 2001). 
The strategy aimed to ensure that central government departments realised 
their commitments to improve service delivery in deprived neighbourhoods 
as stated in their Treasury-agreed Public Service Agreements (PSAs). 
The strategy introduced Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) with a key 
role especially in relation to a new Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF), 
which was allocated to local authorities in 88 eligible areas. This fund was 
designed as a ‘top up’ to be used flexibly to improve core public services 
in the most deprived neighbourhoods. The LSPs brought together local 
authorities and other public services as well as residents and private, 
voluntary and community-sector organisations. Their remit was to identify 
which neighbourhoods should be prioritised, assess the root causes of 
neighbourhood decline, develop strategies and implement agreed actions for 
their amelioration. 
LSPs subsequently were given a central role in shaping the priorities of 
local authorities in England through three-year Local Area Agreements 
(LAA). This reform aimed to create a new form of negotiated contract 
between central and local government, in response to much criticism of 
inflexible ‘top down’ departmental targets. After a pilot phase, LAAs were 
made a statutory responsibility of all upper-tier local authorities in England.6 
A significant development was the introduction of a ‘duty to co-operate’, 
which required specified public sector organisations, including JCP and the 
LSC, to commit to LAAs and work with LSPs.
The LAA framework was constructed of four blocks, one of which 
concerned economic development and employment. LAAs had to 
contain national key targets but partnerships had freedom to select local 
‘improvement targets’. The LAAs set out the priorities for each local area 
and identified funding streams, freedoms and flexibilities needed to support 
delivery. The final deals were negotiated and agreed between regional 
government offices, the local authority and LSP and the main public sector 
organisations in each area. Where an LAA prioritised tackling worklessness 
and committed to ‘stretching targets’, mainstream local authority budgets 
could be utilised to provide investment to meet these targets. Critics 
suggested that the LAA framework relegated other local priorities and 
created a two-tier partnership by giving priority to public sector partners 
that had most influence over delivery. Scepticism among some local agencies 
was shared by some government departments ‘with “silo” behaviour still 
much in evidence’ (Geddes, 2008, p. 122). This behaviour meant that 
despite central efforts to promote partnership, working departments such 
as the DWP continued to give priority to their own more narrowly defined 
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objectives, and seemed unwilling or unable to share information and 
knowledge with local partners.
The new approach to negotiated contracts between central and local 
government extended also to the development of voluntary Multi Area 
Agreements (MAAs), which allowed councils to work with other councils ‘at 
a level that makes good economic sense’ (CLG and DWP, 2007, p. 17). This 
development reflected a growing consensus on the importance of sub-
regional and city-based partnerships in promoting employment, enterprise 
and skills. A key aspect of the MAAs, and LAAs, was that sub-regional 
partnerships and local authorities would commit to more stretching outcome 
targets in return for greater flexibilities from the government.
The Employment Service, new Deal Delivery 
Partnerships and Jobcentre Plus 
In the early 1990s, the Employment Service was responsible for the delivery 
of the ‘stricter benefit regime’ and standardised national services and 
programmes. While the agency worked closely with TECs, it was only weakly 
connected with the work of the new regeneration-related partnerships. 
Many components of the ES delivery system had been contracted out 
but the agency retained direct control of advisory interviews, job broking 
and vacancy placement. Outright privatisation had been rejected by the 
Conservative Government (Price, 2000, p. 304).
The Labour Government appreciated the strategic value of the ES, and 
its track record for swift national implementation, and chose the agency to 
deliver its ‘flagship’ New Deal programmes. Ministers and senior managers 
recognised, however, that the local implementation of the New Deals would 
be quicker and more effective if delivered through a partnership-based 
approach.
In 2007, the ES assumed a leadership role in creating a national network 
of New Deal partnerships. In this early implementation phase District 
Managers were required to consult widely, to form local partnerships and to 
develop District Delivery Plans that were reviewed by Regional Assessment 
Panels. At their best these plans included a rigorous analysis of the area 
which defined priorities and shaped the services and provision on offer; 
the active participation of key partners, at senior level; the commitment by 
business of resources and expertise, in addition to offers of vacancies; and 
the integration of the New Deal with other funding streams, such as ESF 
and skills budgets. There were significant weaknesses, however, with the ES 
acknowledging that the approach represented a significant challenge for 
staff and managers with relatively little experience of partnerships and who 
were exposed to ‘much more open discussion about policy and delivery’ 
and had to ‘very rapidly’ develop ‘new skills of working with and influencing 
others’ (ESC, 1988, Vol. II, p. 188).
The commitment to direct partnership building quickly dissipated, as 
did most of the New Deal partnership arrangements, and the ES was soon 
subject to familiar criticisms concerning its ‘top down’ relationship with 
providers and other local agencies. Such criticisms focused on the lack of 
flexibility in New Deal design and implementation and the limited capacity of 
District Managers to negotiate with partners since they had little autonomy 
over their budgets or control of mainstream contracts (ESC, 1998). 
The Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), as it then was, 
introduced more targeting in the form of nationally designed complementary 
programmes. Key developments included the introduction of Action Teams 
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in areas of highest unemployment and Ethnic Minority Outreach services 
(and later the DWP introduced a Working Neighbourhoods pilot). Other 
specialist employment programmes were targeted at particular groups 
rather than areas (such as claimants with substance abuse problems). These 
programmes created further complexity in local delivery systems.
The most significant area-based variation concerned Employment 
Zones (EZs). The first prototype zones had been implemented through 
local partnerships led by the ES and local authorities in areas with high 
concentrations of unemployment (Haughton, et al., 2000). In 2001 this 
partnership approach was replaced by a radically different model through 
which the DfEE sought to attract new private providers into the British 
welfare to work market. The contracting model involved PbR, greater 
flexibility in service delivery design and, uniquely, a direct transfer of 
resources of savings in benefit payments to providers in a way that rewarded 
early job placement but penalised a failure to place participants into work. 
The new zones became the ‘flagship’ PbR welfare to work programme and 
its relative success reinforced calls for greater flexibility in mainstream 
Jobcentre and New Deal services.
An ‘employment first’ welfare state, Jobcentre Plus and 
the policy context for welfare to work localism
The orientation of the British social security system was reshaped following 
the government’s 1998 decision to create an ‘employment first’ welfare 
state. This involved greater integration of employment services and benefit 
administration and the subsequent extension of work-related activity 
requirements to claimants on previously ‘inactive benefits’, especially lone 
parents and recipients of disability benefits. 
A new delivery approach was first tested through the ‘One’ service, which 
combined benefit delivery and employment assistance previously delivered 
separately by the ES, the Benefits Agency (BA) and local authorities. The 
new service was piloted in twelve areas and, at the time, was associated 
with speculation that local councils or the private sector might be given 
responsibility for the welfare system.7 Before the pilot phase was completed, 
however, the government announced the creation of the DWP and the civil 
service delivered JCP. The new agency, which commenced in April 2002, 
integrated only the BA and the ES, leaving the separate delivery of Housing 
and Council Tax Benefit with local authorities.
Although specific New Deal partnerships were now defunct, JCP 
was, from its inception, required to work with an array of strategic and 
operational ‘partnerships’, both nationally and locally. Local partnership 
arrangements largely were the responsibility of District Managers and 
senior staff who worked with local authorities, LSPs, RDAs and the 
LSC. Operational partnerships mostly involved co-ordination, referral 
and attachment arrangements with contracted providers that delivered 
standardised national contracts awarded and directly managed through 
regional offices.
Despite criticism of the lack of flexibility in DWP provision, a new 
approach was signalled when the DWP and Local Government Association 
(LGA) agreed a Partnership Accord (Simmonds and Westwood, 2008). 
This committed the DWP and JCP to work flexibly with local government 
to deliver improved employment outcomes and to reduce poverty. It was 
especially important that local Accord agreements were signed off by council 
leaders and DWP ministers in the largest cities, and that these agreements 
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facilitated implementation of LAAs. These accords also set the context for 
the development of City Strategy Pathfinders, which in 2006 became the 
first direct experiment in devolving aspects of DWP-related welfare to work 
policy to local government (see City Strategy Pathfinders below). 
The new approach to welfare to work localism took place within the 
context of wider developments through which the Labour Government 
formulated new objectives and policies that involved changes in the design 
and delivery of welfare to work programmes; the activation of more 
working-age claimants through a ‘personalised conditionality regime’; 
improved integration of employment and skills provision; and some 
devolution of the design and delivery of programmes. The most significant 
policies and delivery shifts that occurred in the period are shown in the 
form of a timeline (see Table 1) and are considered in more detail in the 
following sections. They serve to illustrate the continual development and 
flux in welfare to work policy within which local delivery was designed and 
implemented.
Table 1: Timeline of key policies, drivers and delivery changes shaping 
welfare to work devolution 2006–2010
Year Policy and drivers Delivery shifts/programmes
2006 •  Leitch Review of Skills – Employment 
and Skills Boards
•  A New Deal: Empowering People to 
Work – initiates consultation on next 
phase of activation and programme 
reforms
•  Local Area and Multi Area 
Agreements
2007 •  The Freud Review of Welfare to Work 
– proposes prime contractor-led 
welfare to work market
•  Treasury Review of Sub-National 
Economic Development and 
Regeneration – highlights role of city-
regions in economic growth
•  Pathways to Work – new 
prime contractor variant of 
the programme targeted at 
people on disability benefits
•  Working Neighbourhoods 
Fund
•  City Strategy Pathfinders 
implemented
2008 •  Raising Expectations and Increasing 
Support white paper – proposes three 
levels of devolution
•  Employment and Support Allowance 
introduced and lone parent work-
conditionality extended
•  DWP Commissioning 
Strategy
2009 The Houghton Review – proposes local 
authority based Work and Skills Plans
•  Flexible New Deal – Phase 1
•  Recession responses – Future 
Jobs Fund
•  Total Place pilots
2010 •  Child Poverty Act 2010 requires local 
authorities and named partners to 
‘co-operate’ in preparing local needs 
assessments and developing joint child 
poverty strategies
•  Building Bridges to Work white paper 
– commits DWP to build and deepen 
local partnerships and implement the 
three-tier approach to welfare to work 
devolution
•  Flexible New Deal – Phase 2
•  Personalised Employment 
Programme pilots – to test 
multi-claimant contracts 
and funding providers from 
benefit savings
Source: Adapted from Figure 2.1, Green and Adam, 2011
22Welfare to work devolution in England
City-regions, sub-regional partnerships and integrating 
employment and skills 
Two Treasury-led reviews confirmed the growing importance attached by 
the Labour Government to integrating employment and skills provision and 
to sub-regional city strategies for promoting economic and employment 
growth.
The Leitch Report (2006), a review of the skill needs of the UK economy, 
highlighted the weak connections between the ‘employment first’ welfare 
to work system and the separately funded and delivered vocational skills 
system, especially programmes targeted at the employers of low-skilled adult 
workers. This fragmentation was considered to exacerbate poor employment 
retention rates and benefit recycling among those leaving the benefit 
system, with many ‘successful’ job entrants with few transferable skills or 
qualifications being ‘trapped in low paid, entry-level work’ (Leitch, 2006, 
p. 118). The report pointed out that poor levels of employer engagement 
meant that much of the welfare to work system was not responding to the 
market effectively. Among other recommendations, the report proposed the 
creation of an integrated employment and skills system and the development 
of a national network of employer-led Employment and Skills Boards (ESBs). 
In its response, the government announced a wide range of changes, 
including the introduction of ‘skills checks’ and assessments delivered by 
JCP, which was expected also to support the work of a new adult careers 
and guidance service. In three areas, pilot programmes were developed to 
test delivery of a ‘tailored employment and skills offer’ that would create 
a ‘single customer journey, from poor skills or worklessness to sustainable 
employment and the skills to progress’ (HMG, 2007, p. 25). 
The subsequent Treasury Review of Sub-National Economic Development 
and Regeneration built on a series of studies underlining the importance of 
policy settings in city-regions for overall growth, employment levels and 
productivity (HMT, 2007). The Review proposed a statutory duty for local 
authorities to promote economic development and for local authorities 
to work across boundaries with other agencies to boost sub-regional 
economies. In many parts of the country, especially the core cities,8 sub-
regional partnerships involving local councils and employers already existed 
but their coverage was extended and their activity given greater authority 
through the negotiation of MAAs, the first of which were then being 
agreed.9 The Sub-National Review also supported the local development of 
ESBs, which were to build on existing employer-related partnerships and 
reflect local conditions. 
In a 2008 joint policy paper, the DWP and the then Department for 
Innovation, Universities and Skills committed to improving the interaction 
of the welfare and skills systems while devolving ‘much more responsibility 
to local councils’. The departments stressed, however, that such devolution 
would only be given if there was strong employer representation within the 
partnership responsible for an MAA, including an ‘employer-dominated body’ 
(HMG, 2008, p. 38). 
Within two years, most sub-regional partnerships had developed 
such employer-led bodies (Croden and Simmonds, 2008). There was no 
prescribed model for ESBs but their typical role involved engaging local 
employers, articulating labour market needs, scrutinising local provision 
and recommending improvements to integrate welfare to work and skills 
services. By the time of the 2010 election, the different ESBs had a variable 
record in shaping local skills and employment services for employers and 
jobseekers and in influencing the delivery of JCP and skills services. In 
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some areas, where partnerships had a strong track record, such as Greater 
Manchester and the West Midlands, there was the start of bringing together 
the complementary commissioning and delivery of employment and skills 
services.
The Working neighbourhood Fund 
Within the DWP, the government focus on further ‘devolution’ was 
reflected in two particular developments. These concerned the role of more 
flexible programme funds targeted at areas with high concentrations of 
worklessness and the parallel development of partnership-led City Strategy 
Pathfinders. 
The DWP Deprived Areas Fund (DAF) was a £90 million fund introduced 
in 200610 that ‘pooled’ together the earlier more prescriptive area-based 
programmes that JCP had been delivering. It was allocated to cover 903 
local authority wards with the lowest employment rates, and 272 wards with 
the highest proportions of minority ethnic groups. JCP District Managers 
were given flexibility to tailor support for local residents but procurement 
remained with the region. Around half of DAF funds were allocated to City 
Strategy Pathfinders and were subsequently devolved as grants to the 
partnerships which started up in 2007–08 (see City Strategy Pathfinders 
below).
The remaining DAF funding was subsequently absorbed into the more 
substantial Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF), which also replaced the 
NRF of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG).11 
It was suggested that the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal 
had been effective, with Whitehall departments now having a clear focus on 
deprived areas and the mainstreaming of successful innovations developed 
through the NRF (CLG and DWP, 2007). Worklessness, however, remained 
a particular problem and the ‘pooled’ CLG and DWP fund, worth £1.5 billion 
over three years, was more narrowly focused on supporting efforts to tackle 
unemployment and low levels of skills and enterprise in deprived areas.
WNF was a distinct element of a new Area Based Grant. This was a new 
block grant designed to give local authorities more flexibility over their 
mainstream resources by moving some £5 billion of former specific-grant 
support into non-ring-fenced allocations. Although WNF was not ring-
fenced CLG had a ‘strong expectation’ that areas receiving the fund would 
include targets on tackling worklessness in their LAA, which would then 
drive resource allocation and service delivery. An evaluation of subsequent 
implementation in 24 out of the 61 areas receiving WNF found that it took 
time to develop local strategy and commission services, with many councils 
only commencing delivery three years after the fund was allocated. Most 
areas were considered to be addressing the purposes of the fund but others 
had used the funding to support a wider range of LAA activity that only 
tackled ‘worklessness to a degree’ (CLG, 2010, p. 6). It was significant too 
that the availability of WNF and its flexibility was appreciated because it 
enabled many areas to respond more quickly to the impact of the recession 
and increased unemployment.
City Strategy Pathfinders 
The City Strategy was initially announced in the green paper A New Deal 
for Welfare (DWP, 2006). This experiment in welfare to work devolution 
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was a response to growing pressure from local government and the leading 
core cities, which argued that, in return for welfare to work devolution 
and increased flexibility, they would be able to more effectively increase 
employment rates and reduce welfare dependency in their areas. 
The City Strategy was based on the assumption that local partners could 
deliver more if they combined and aligned their efforts (and funding) behind 
shared priorities, and had more freedom to test new ideas and to tailor 
services in response to local need. At the time, ministers suggested that 
the new approach being tested was not a short-term ‘fix’ but ‘an important 
platform of delivering a localised welfare system for the long term’ (WPC, 
2007, p. 42).
The DWP invited bids from partnerships in local areas to become 
City Strategy Pathfinders. The stakeholders were free to define the 
most appropriate geography in which to work. Following submission of 
expressions of interest, 15 areas were selected, three in Scotland and two 
in Wales, with two-year contracts commencing in April 2007 (subsequently 
extended to March 2011).
The City Strategy Pathfinders (CSPs) were often built on existing 
partnerships and would variously include more or less senior representation 
from local authorities, employers, health services, the voluntary sector and 
JCP. The partnerships submitted business plans which, among other things, 
identified implementation barriers to improving local employment rates and 
contained a series of ‘asks’ of DWP for related flexibilities. The requested 
flexibilities varied across areas, reflecting local priorities, but could be 
grouped into four themes (Crighton, et al., 2009, p. 60):
•	 improved data sharing to enable better targeting of provision;
•	 improved access to training for individuals who needed it;
•	 improved transitions from benefits to employment programmes and to 
employment; and 
•	 improved approaches to funding, contracting and the development of 
local targets.
The DWP established an Enabling Measures Board, with representation from 
CSPs, which considered the varied requests. Ministers had already made clear 
that flexibility would not be allowed in the ‘core rights and responsibilities 
agenda’ or the level of benefits payable. There was improvement in data 
sharing by the DWP, some increased influence on local training and 
employment programmes, and £32 million in DAF funding was awarded 
once CSPs had committed to ‘stretching’ local targets. The lack of progress 
on most other measures demonstrated, however, the ‘substantial difficulty’ 
the DWP had in offering the freedoms and flexibilities requested (Crighton, 
et al., 2009, p. 59). This was compounded by the limited capacity of JCP 
and the variable willingness of District Managers to change and tailor their 
mainstream activities across the CSPs. 
There was no progress on the more radical proposition that CSP areas 
should be rewarded for high performance by receiving a proportion of any 
additional benefit payments saved attributable to their interventions – a 
proposition that the DWP only considered for funding contracted providers 
(see Work Programme contract design and incentives in Chapter 3). Instead, 
a simple £5 million ‘reward fund’ was created for distribution to the 15 
CSPs in the event of meeting their agreed targets. All the CSPs agreed two 
standard targets – specifying a 3% reduction in the numbers on working-age 
benefits and an equivalent increase in local employment rates – with other 
targets tailored to fit local circumstances and priorities.
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An early aim of the City Strategy was to allow the pooling of existing 
regeneration, skills, and employment budgets, with several CSPs wanting 
joint commissioning processes (WPC, 2007, pp. 50–1). In practice, it was 
far easier for CSPs to seek to ‘align’ existing budgets rather than persuade 
agencies to contribute funds to a ‘single pot’. The formal evaluation found 
some examples of joint commissioning between, for example, CSPs and 
health service providers, but more commonly the CSP sought to influence 
the procurement of mainstream employment and skills services through 
dialogue (Adam and Green, 2012).
CSP innovation was constrained because the partnerships delivering 
the pathfinders were not given the local enabling measures requested, but 
they did have an impact on local service provision. Some CSPs focused on 
delivery, developing particular projects aimed at different client groups in 
different areas. Some services were delivered conventionally but targeted at 
new or under-served groups. In other instances, CSPs instituted new delivery 
models, including the co-location of wraparound services, such as welfare 
and benefits advice, to complement mainstream provision.12 Several CSPs 
adopted a ‘pipeline’ model of provision, commissioning services to provide 
more balanced local provision, especially around engagement activities or 
working with disability benefit claimants. While individual services may have 
been similar ‘the marshalling of them into a more coherent system … often 
was new’ (Adam and Green, 2012, p. 508).
The City Strategy was implemented in very different economic 
circumstances to those envisaged when the business plans were developed, 
with increased unemployment making it impossible to meet the original 
targets. Nevertheless, the final evaluation found that the partnerships acted 
as a focal point for different agencies, improved the co-ordination of local 
provision, and gave partnerships the opportunity to test different localised 
approaches. The risk was that the knowledge gained through partnership 
working was at risk of being lost following change in central government in 
2010 (Adam and Green, 2012).
Centralising DWP procurement and the developing role 
of prime contractors 
Developments in the ‘economic decentralisation’ of DWP programmes were 
more radical and involved new flexibilities that were not extended to the 
CSPs. The process commenced in 2006 when 1,000 individual New Deal 
contracts were awarded to 94 ‘prime contractors’ who were responsible for 
delivering all standardised New Deal ‘options’ in JCP districts. Subsequently, 
in 2007, procurement of all employment programmes was centralised. 
Previously, JCP had purchased and managed contracted services through its 
regional offices, and DWP had been directly responsible only for procuring 
experimental programmes, such as EZs, which were testing alternatives to 
JCP provision. The decision to centralise was taken to reduce complexity, 
achieve more consistent contracting standards and eliminate a perceived 
conflict of interest in JCP’s role in both awarding contracts and providing 
services.
More radical change was then proposed by the independent Freud 
Report (2007). The report suggested little change to JCP-delivered work-
first services for the short-term unemployed but proposed radical change 
in how services were commissioned for the longer-term unemployed and 
other groups. 
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A central proposition in the Report concerned a different approach 
to funding. The aim was to revise a long-standing HM Treasury rule that 
demand-driven entitlement cash benefits and cash-limited employment 
programmes were funded from separate budgets.13 Freud proposed instead 
a funding model under which large prime providers would invest their own 
resources in services up front and would be paid from the future benefit 
savings that would accrue from placing claimants into sustained employment. 
This risk transfer would align DWP and provider incentives and enable the 
department to ‘uncap’ and extend welfare to work programmes to cover 
many more workless people, especially those receiving disability benefits.
The government accepted Freud’s proposals and, after a further 
consultation process, DWP published its Commissioning Strategy in 
February 2008. When announcing the strategy, the Secretary of State for 
Employment emphasised that the government was ‘creating a market for the 
long term’ that would ‘free’ providers ‘from central control and allow them 
to innovate’ (Purnell, 2008). The core elements of the new procurement 
approach comprised the following:
•	 Contract scale and duration: the system would be made attractive to 
larger scale, well-capitalised prime providers that would be awarded long-
term (typically five-year) and higher value contracts. Contract Package 
Areas (CPA) would be geographically large in order to provide the scale 
of participant volumes required. The consequence was that DWP would 
contract for services with fewer providers delivering over much larger 
areas which straddled multiple local authorities.
•	 An outcome-based funding model: the payment system would largely 
reward job outcomes and employment retention with payments 
differentiated, recognising that helping some groups was more costly 
than helping others. A prime contractor had to arrange the finance, 
invest ‘up front’ and assume a greater share of the risk but would have an 
income stream from future outcome and sustainment payments.
•	 Partners and supply chains: prime providers would be responsible for 
working with other local organisations and for marshalling and managing 
an appropriate blend of subcontractors to deliver services for a wide 
variety of participants. Most existing DWP providers, including many local 
authority agencies, would no longer have a direct contractual relationship 
with the department.
Implementation of the new contracting model commenced with the Flexible 
New Deal (FND) that started to replace New Deal and EZ provision for 
the long-term unemployed in 2009, and paid for six-month job outcomes. 
Labour ministers were more wary, however, about longer-term outcome 
payments and about funding employment programmes directly from benefit 
savings, simply announcing that the approach would be tested through pilot 
schemes from 2011. 
A new strategy for welfare to work devolution
In 2008, the DWP launched a consultation and in 2009 published a white 
Paper; together they outlined the government’s approach to a multiple 
‘devolution’ as a way to transform standardised national welfare to work 
services into a more ‘personalised’ and locally tailored system. The new 
approach involved devolving more power to individual service users (through 
testing an individual budget14) and to providers, JCP advisers, and to local 
partnerships. 
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Providers would be given freedom in service delivery through the black 
box approach to contracting. JCP would have more flexibility, with pilots 
subsequently established in four districts where managers and advisers were 
given greater latitude over the support offered to and the responsibilities 
required from service users. JCP advisers were also able to implement new 
ways of integrating employment with skills support, and in-work advisory 
support was tested with some groups (DWP, 2009). 
The welfare to work devolution proposed for partnerships and city-
regions was conditional and would work in a context where a national core 
of services would be maintained country-wide. Three levels of devolution 
would be available to partnership bodies established at local authority or 
sub-regional level:
•	 In the ‘core model’, local partners would be consulted on the organisation 
of JCP services and the commissioning of DWP programmes, including 
the evaluation of bids and subsequent contract management. 
•	 At the second tier, partners could supplement the spine of national 
provision with additional wraparound services to address specific local 
issues. The DWP would ‘co-commission’ mainstream services and align 
these with the funded services of local authorities, skills funding agencies 
and regional development bodies. 
•	 A third ‘joint venture’ tier involved devolution of a role in the making 
of contracts and, in the most committed areas, experimentation with 
‘a fully devolved model’. For these areas, the DWP would be a partner 
in a local procurement exercise, specifying the outcome requirements 
but devolving some or all of the commissioning, funding and contract 
management arrangements to a local partner or joint commissioning 
body.
The DWP was emphatic that there was ‘something for something’ and that it 
would only devolve power where it would lead to increased job outcomes – 
it was ‘not for devolution’s own sake’ (DWP, 2008, p. 122). 
The DWP tiered approach to welfare to work devolution was 
complemented by the subsequent Houghton Report (2009). This proposed 
a new duty whereby local authorities would develop Worklessness 
Assessments for their areas. Those authorities that wanted to align budgets 
and co-commission services would develop Work and Skills Plans. Areas 
with ‘robust partnerships’ would be able to create Work and Skills Integrated 
Budgets through which central and local government would be able to pool 
and align budgets and co-commission with a substantial portion of relevant 
funds. If such areas did not already have employer-led ESBs, they would be 
required to establish them.
The welfare to work devolution strategy had emerged just as the 
UK entered recession and experienced subsequent rapid increases in 
unemployment. JCP and local authorities played a major role in ensuring 
benefits were paid and in speedily delivering a new range of national 
recession-related employment programmes, including the Future Jobs 
Fund. In combination with mainstream provision, these programmes played 
a significant role in mitigating increased unemployment. Nevertheless, 
unemployment increased most in the communities which already had the 
highest unemployment (Tunstall and Fenton, 2009).
These factors underpinned the Labour Government’s commitment 
to continuing ‘to build and deepen local partnership arrangements’ and 
to ensure that ‘no place is left behind as we emerge from the recession’ 
(DWP, 2010, pp. 56; 61). A 2010 White Paper reaffirmed the commitment 
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to implement the three-tier approach to devolution, pointing to examples 
where sub-regional partnerships in Liverpool and Nottingham, and the 
Manchester Forerunner City Region, had already undertaken some co-
commissioning of JCP services. 
This white paper also connected the development of a new Total Place 
initiative with the government’s previous implementation of the Houghton 
Report, whereby upper-tier local authorities now had a duty to undertake 
worklessness assessments, and develop work and skills plans. Total Place 
was being pioneered in 13 local areas, and testing ways of bringing agencies 
together locally to develop cost-effective front-line solutions to securing 
shared outcomes. The DWP had committed JCP to testing co-location  
of services with local authorities, and the white paper suggested that  
some areas might also use work and skills plans to identify similar synergies 
and cost savings in welfare to work funding and service delivery (DWP, 
2010, p. 120).
The final development referred to in the white paper concerned the new 
role for local partners in tackling child poverty. This highlighted the statutory 
responsibility of local authorities to develop joint strategies setting out how 
they would co-ordinate services to reduce child poverty in their areas up 
to 2020. Such strategies placed much emphasis on increasing employment 
rates among workless households through the improved co-ordination of 
local employment, training and support services.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the different ways in which earlier governments 
sought to make a highly centralised welfare to work delivery system more 
responsive to local conditions and better aligned with regeneration and 
skills policies. Reforms comprised different types of governance and funding 
arrangements. These included the transition from early area advisory bodies 
to employer-led boards, which controlled devolved budgets, alongside the 
development of multi-agency partnerships which, among other things, 
sought to align employment and skills services and funding. Each wave 
of institutional and programme reform saw the increased involvement 
of local authorities as the major place-based strategic partner in tackling 
worklessness in high unemployment areas.
Central government models for funding employment and related services 
evolved from the early disaggregation of national budgets to fund local 
provision and the payment of grants and awards to external providers. By 
2010, there were more competitive public and private funding arrangements 
in place which sought to improve performance, share risk and, in the case 
of private contractors delivering employment programmes, partially share 
the proceeds of benefit savings generated by employment outcomes. 
Competition was also extended to financing regeneration programmes, 
where local government played a key role in partnership formation between 
employers and public agencies and in the preparation of competitive bids. 
Through these bidding processes, local government typically analysed local 
needs and circumstances and increasingly outlined strategies and services 
through which partnerships could co-ordinate and improve provision for 
tackling worklessness and benefit dependency.
The policy experiences from these periods reveal tensions at the heart 
of localising welfare to work policies. The most significant concerned the 
long-standing wariness of DWP ministers and senior civil servants to cede 
influence or control over Jobcentres and the target-driven core ‘rights 
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and responsibilities’ agenda. The DWP acknowledged the need to work 
more closely with local government but in this context the three tiers of 
devolution proposed merely committed to different levels of consultation 
with local partners invited to help design and fund supplementary provision 
for groups poorly served by mainstream programmes. 
The DWP’s approach to greater localism was driven also by growing 
pressure from local government. By 2010, more ambitious devolution 
strategies had been outlined by the London Mayor, the Core Cities (2009), 
the Local Government Association (LGA, 2009), Kent County Council (2010) 
and the New Local Government Network (Brand, et al., 2008). The strategies 
were built on the experience of the various pilots and approaches local 
authorities had helped test in the previous decade. The proposals variously 
suggested that local authority-led partnerships were best placed to improve 
the performance of fragmented employment and skills programmes. The 
central element of the ‘deal’ being proposed was that mainstream welfare 
to work and skills programmes should be devolved and co-commissioned by 
sub-regional or local partnerships with capable governance structures. These 
partnerships would commit to improved employment and skills outcomes, 
in return for which they would be given the flexibility to vary national rules. 
Programme budgets would be devolved and pooled, with partnerships 
enjoying flexibility to re-invest surpluses they generated. Devolution should 
also be accompanied by greater information and data sharing between public 
agencies, with local JCP and LSC managers freed from central targets and 
with flexibility to fully engage with their local partnerships. 
More radical proposals were also advocated by some local authority 
leaders, Conservative MPs and right-of-centre think tanks, calling for the 
benefit system itself to be localised. For example, a 2009 submission from 
Essex County Council to the LGA proposed that local authorities should 
receive a welfare block grant with powers to determine for themselves how 
much should be spent on benefits and employment programmes, and who 
would be eligible. Other reports pointed directly to the apparent success of 
welfare devolution in the USA, typically proposing that responsibility for the 
benefit system be devolved to lower tiers of government with freedom to 
develop and commission local work-based welfare systems (see, for example, 
Hannan and Carswell, 2009; CPS and DD, 2007). These proposals were 
linked at the time to Conservative Party plans to devolve power locally15 
but were not adopted. The Conservative Party was instead proposing other 
radical changes and the decentralisation envisaged was to be through 
welfare to work prime contractors not through local partnerships. 
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3 WElFARE REFORm, 
lOCAliSm AnD 
WElFARE TO WORK 
DEvOlUTiOn in 
EnGlAnD
Following the 2010 election, the Coalition 
Government placed welfare reform at the heart 
of its plans to reduce ‘dependency’ and public 
expenditure. The Coalition Agreement also 
committed to ‘localism’ and a radical approach to 
devolution, giving new powers and opportunities 
to ‘councils, communities, neighbourhoods and 
individuals’. 
Both these ambitions have been reflected in wide-ranging policy changes, 
with welfare reform in particular intended to reduce expenditure on social 
security and encourage employment as the primary pathway out of poverty. 
This chapter considers the Coalition Government’s welfare to work reforms 
and their alignment with local growth policies. It reviews how DWP ministers 
and officials have given a local dimension to national welfare reforms, with 
local government given new devolved responsibility for aspects of the 
benefit system. It assesses also the developing role of local authorities and 
LEPs and the ways in which these stakeholders are using City Deals and 
Growth Deals to influence and shape local employment and skills provision. 
It concludes by reviewing proposals made by local government stakeholders 
and others calling for more comprehensive devolution of welfare to work 
provision after 2015. 
The most significant policies and delivery shifts that occurred in the 
period are shown in the form of a timeline (see Table 2) and are considered 
in more detail in the following sections. They illustrate that the rapid rate 
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of change in national welfare to work and related localism policies further 
intensified under the Coalition Government.
Table 2: Timeline of key policies, drivers and delivery changes shaping 
welfare to work devolution 2010–2014
Year Policy and drivers Delivery shifts/programmes
2010 •  Welfare reform white paper outlining 
case for Universal Credit 
•  Abolition of Regional Development 
Agencies
•  Ministerial letter to local council and 
business leaders about formation of 
Local Enterprise Partnerships
•  Cancellation of Flexible New Deal phase 2
•  Notice of termination of New Deals and other 
mainstream employment programmes 
•  Competition for the Employment Related 
Support Services Framework completed and 
successful preferred suppliers notified
•  Work Programme competition commences
2011 •  Localism Act – Core Cities 
Amendment and removal of statutory 
requirements concerning Local and 
Multi Area Agreements and Local 
Strategic Partnerships 
•  Unlocking Growth in Cities document 
released, leading to City Deals
•  Community Budgets prospectus 
published
•  Work Programme prime providers selected and 
commence delivery
•  Jobcentre Plus Offer launched, underpinned 
by the new JCP Performance Management 
Framework
•  JCP Flexible Support Fund replaces Deprived 
Areas and other discretionary funds
•  End of JCP Executive Agency Status and of City 
Strategy Pathfinders
•  First 16 Community Budgets for families with 
multiple problems established
•  4 Whole Place Community Budgets and  
10 Neighbourhood Community Budgets 
announced
2012 •  Welfare Reform Act – provides for 
the introduction of Universal Credit
•  Lord Heseltine’s No Stone Unturned 
report – case for increased ‘single pot’ 
funding for LEPs, including devolution 
of skills and employment programmes
•  First wave of City Deals for 8 Core Cities agreed
•  4 Whole Place Community Budget areas publish 
operational plans setting out how they intend to 
reform some public services in their areas over 
the next five years
•  The Department for Communities and Local 
Government launches four-year Troubled 
Families programme
•  The DWP launches three-year Families with 
Multiple Problems programme
2013 •  Universal Credit Local Support 
Services Framework published
•  Release of initial guidance to LEPs on 
Growth Deals and European Structural 
and Investment Fund strategies
•  Universal Credit implementation starts in 
pathfinder areas in April; gradual national roll-
out from October (anticipated completion now 
delayed from 2017 to 2019)
•  Council Tax Benefit replaced by Council Tax 
Support
•  Elements of Social Fund replaced by 
discretionary local welfare arrangements
•  20 City Deals negotiated in wave 2
2014 •  Revised DWP Commissioning Strategy
•  ‘Greater Manchester Agreement’, 
announcing the devolution of some 
powers over skills and employment 
services to the Combined Authority 
•  ‘Smith Commission’ indicates that the 
Work Programme and some other 
employment programmes will be 
devolved to the Scottish government
•  39 Local Enterprise Partnership Growth Deals 
announced
•  DWP announces Work Programme contract in  
Scotland to be extended for a year to 2017
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Welfare reform and supporting local economic growth
Welfare reform has been led by the DWP and has comprised multiple 
changes to the benefit system, employment services and contracted-out 
programmes. These changes have intensified a reform process which is 
reshaping individual work incentives and transforming the organisational 
landscape of the welfare state. JCP staffing has been reduced and its 
regional tier of management removed, with 37 large districts now  
each working with multiple local authorities.16 Service delivery is being 
reorganised through greater use of digital channels for managing job  
search, communications, and benefit transactions.17 A small number  
of largely for-profit prime providers now deliver most mainstream  
employment programmes either directly or through subcontractor  
supply chains.
There has also been a complete change in the structures and funding 
mechanisms to support local economic growth, with the government 
devolving some budgets and powers and envisaging a future in which 
LEPs formulate local growth strategies and local authorities put ‘economic 
development at the heart of all they do’ (CLG and DWP, 2014, p. 4).18 
This local devolution only partly offsets the cuts in economic development 
funding associated with the abolition of RDAs, which also saw the 
recentralisation of many economic development functions, such as ‘inward 
investment, business support, innovation, venture capital, sector support and 
aspects of skills and European policy’ (Bentley, et al., 2010). 
Devolution to local government has been more extensive and involved, 
among other things, the creation of a ‘general power of competence’ 
for local authorities; the removal of ‘ring fences’ on central government 
grants; ending targets associated with ‘the old, top-down local performance 
framework’; and the development of Community Budgets (which replaced 
Total Place initiatives) to test ways of integrating public service delivery at 
local level. The Localism Act (2010) also contained a clause known as the 
Core Cities Amendment. This provision allows local authorities to make the 
case for receiving new powers to promote local economic growth which, 
among other things, is the basis on which powers may be devolved through 
City and Growth Deals (CO, 2011, p. 4). 
Local government reform is being driven also by the scale of reductions 
in central government funding and by associated changes in how that 
funding is allocated among local authorities. This includes the localisation 
of Council Tax Benefit (see Devolution of the Social Fund and Council Tax 
Benefit) and a Business Rates Retention Scheme which allows councils 
to retain half of any increase in local business rates.19 These changes give 
local authorities greater incentives to develop their local economies but 
expose them to greater risks associated with variations in local economic 
development and potential (Sandford, 2014, p. 11). 
Some consequences of these changes were multiple staff reductions, 
role changes and public sector reorganisations, causing disruption to existing 
partnerships and more integrated patterns of local service delivery. It has 
inevitably taken time for front-line managers and staff to settle into new 
roles and to develop and re-establish local partnership working within the 
new remits determined by central government.
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Universal Credit delivery, local welfare reform, and 
employment and skills budgets
The implementation of welfare reform and the gradual introduction of UC 
are having an impact on the relationship between JCP and local authorities.20 
The first aspect of this change concerns benefit design and delivery with 
UC reforms centralising Housing Benefit administration while devolving 
responsibility for Council Tax support. The second aspect concerns the 
employment assistance now being given by local authorities to workless 
residents as a key way to ‘mitigate’ the impact of benefit reductions on local 
households.
The DWP is implementing a ‘digital by default’ approach to making and 
managing benefit claims and it is envisaged that some 80% of UC claimants 
will manage all benefit-related aspects of their claim online. The DWP 
accepts that a significant group of claimants will experience transitional 
or longer-term difficulties in meeting the behavioural and financial 
requirements of the new UC system. It published a Universal Credit ‘Local 
Support Services Framework’ (LSSF) jointly with the LGA. This set out 
broadly how the DWP intends to share responsibility with local partnerships 
for developing services delivering assistance with digital inclusion, personal 
budgeting support, and ‘bringing people closer to work’. The expectation is 
that each local authority will engage with its DWP Partnership Manager to 
bring together organisations with the appropriate skills to plan and provide 
local support services.
The department has funded LSSF pilots testing different delivery models, 
with local authorities and partnerships considering how to integrate benefit-
related services with employment support (DWP, 2014a). In many areas 
there is uncertainty, however, about how partnerships will operate, with 
local actors awaiting clarity from the DWP on the responsibilities they are 
expected to assume and any funding to be made available (WPC, 2014). 
Delays in the national implementation timetable, related to problems in 
developing administrative and IT systems for UC, are further hampering the 
development of local support services. Large-scale roll-out of UC to existing 
claimants now seems unlikely before 2016.
The LGA argues that in order for claimants to respond to UC incentives 
and to mitigate the impact of benefit reductions, local authorities need 
greater control of welfare to work programmes. In an LGA-commissioned 
study Wilson, et al. (2013) estimate that, on existing trends and policy 
settings, only a quarter of welfare recipients would be in a position 
to mitigate benefit reductions by finding work or moving to cheaper 
accommodation. The LGA concludes that without greater powers over 
employment, skills and housing provision councils will struggle to meet 
the increased demands that their other services and budgets are likely to 
experience. 
The national employment and skills budgets highlighted by the LGA 
remain large even after expenditure cuts. One study estimated that in the 
current spending period, national departments continue to invest annual 
funding of £1.59 billion in employment support programmes and a further 
£11.36 billion in skills-related provision (LGA-CESI, 2014, p. 37). Much of 
this employment services and skills expenditure continues to be channelled 
into local areas through multiple contracts with national agencies, and  
the poor local targeting and co-ordination of these services have fuelled 
growing demands from local government stakeholders for greater 
devolution. Figure 1 gives the data for employment programmes commonly 
proposed for devolution.
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Figure 1: Funding for employment and skills programmes in England 
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Devolution of the Social Fund and Council Tax Benefit
Welfare reform has already been accompanied by the devolution of  
two significant elements of the national benefit system. The devolution  
of responsibility for, and funding of, elements of the Social Fund  
and former Council Tax Benefit has involved the replacement of  
demand-driven centrally financed cash benefits with more discretionary 
forms of local support. 
In April 2013, the Crisis Loan and Community Grant elements of the 
Social Fund were abolished, with central government providing a one-year 
transitional grant to English local authorities and the devolved national 
governments. Ministers removed the national programme to control costs 
and on the assumption that councils were best placed to judge the types of 
emergency support needed by local people (CESI-LGA, 2014). In England, 
the resulting ‘local welfare schemes’ vary; councils take different approaches 
to eligibility criteria, access arrangements, application procedures, decision-
making and appeals processes. Local councils sought to combine different 
forms of support and many local funds now offer only in-kind support (such 
as payment cards or vouchers) rather than cash loans or grants. There were 
reports of confused front-line responsibilities, especially with Jobcentres, 
but councils have since reported being able to reduce repeat demand for 
assistance by moving resources into more preventative work and doing  
more to meet the underlying needs of applicants (CESI-LGA, 2014). More 
critical reviews have found marked variations in take-up and in the level 
of support given, resulting in a ‘postcode lottery’ of local welfare support 
throughout England (Gibbons, 2013; Butler, et al., 2014). Both councils 
and welfare rights organisations have proposed that government should 
continue to specifically fund arrangements to meet emergency needs but 
this seems unlikely.
Council Tax Benefit (CTB) was abolished in 2013 and replaced by Council 
Tax support schemes designed and administered by over 300 English local 
authorities. The projected CTB budget was cut by 10% (or £490 million per 
year), with funding no longer paid through a separate needs-based central 
government grant but from more general resources. Although councils 
were given flexibility, the legislation mandates that they offer the same 
levels of Council Tax support to pensioners and war pensioners previously 
available under the national system. This means the burden of adjustment 
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either passed on to the 2.5 million working-age CTB claimants or other 
local budgets. In 2013–14, most councils reduced the support available with 
over 70% introducing small charges for previously protected working-age 
claimants (NAO, 2013b). 
Council Tax localisation has advantages, and councils have an interest in 
designing support schemes that make work pay, but the change has created 
‘undesirable incentives for councils as well as desirable ones’ (Adam and 
Browne, 2012). Variation across the country also has reduced the simplicity 
that UC is supposed to bring, by introducing a separate administrative 
process for in-work and out-of-work benefit claimants to navigate and a 
separate taper that may undermine the financial incentives to work created 
by UC (NAO, 2013b; Bushe, et al., 2013).21 
Delivering employment services – Jobcentres and the 
Flexible Support Fund
The DWP mainstream welfare to work delivery system is now comprised 
of a national network of over 700 Jobcentres and a mixed economy of 
contracted providers. Despite expenditure cuts, the government still spent 
some £2 billion on active labour market support delivered through these 
services in 2012–13, making it by far the largest provider of welfare to work 
and employment support services in local areas (HMG, 2014, p. 48). Most of 
the budget is spent on Jobcentre operating costs and their related advisory 
services and programmes.
The DWP has made major organisational changes since 2010 and 
suggests that these have enabled the organisation to secure the efficiency 
gains of a national delivery and contracting system while giving Jobcentres 
and prime contractors ‘freedoms and flexibilities’ that facilitate co-ordinated 
local service delivery and better engagement with LEPs and local authorities. 
The Jobcentre Plus Offer introduced limited flexibility in the activation 
regime by giving District Managers and front-line advisers some discretion 
over the frequency of interviews required and the employment support 
made available. This approach is supported by the Flexible Support Fund 
(FSF), which replaced earlier targeted discretionary funds (expenditure 
estimated at £122 million in 2012–13). The fund can be used to provide 
individual support directly to jobseekers or managers can use it to procure 
small-scale programmes for specific target groups (OECD, 2014a, p. 141). 
This discretionary funding includes the availability of responsive ‘partnership 
opportunities’ through which the DWP may award grants of up to £50,000 
to test new approaches targeted at harder-to-place groups. Little is known 
about the outcomes secured through these discretionary funding streams.
The local flexibilities of Jobcentres continue to be exercised within a clear 
national (vertical) accountability framework in which front-line staff must 
contribute to meeting the DWP’s national targets (Wilson and Gallagher, 
2013). These are to ‘move people off benefit, into employment, as quickly  
as possible’ and reduce the monetary value of fraud and error. The first 
target is measured only through off-benefit flows (measured at 13, 26, 39 
and 52 weeks) with JCP tasked to ensure some 88.5% of those claiming 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) cease claiming within a year. Early positive 
evaluation results of the more flexible regime have been overshadowed, 
however, by concerns of perverse target-driven behaviour, such as 
preferential treatment for those claimants thought most likely to contribute 
to meet short-term targets or applying inappropriate pressure on people to 
drop their benefit claims (WPC, 2014; NAO, 2013c). The implementation 
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Local authorities, and 
now LEPs, have no 
direct role in the design 
or commissioning of 
JCP support and only 
limited influence on 
how resources are 
deployed to meet local 
needs.
of the core benefit regime and concerns about the ‘off-benefit’ target have 
also been a source of tension between the DWP, Jobcentres and local 
partners and in many high unemployment areas weaken the willingness of 
other organisations (such as health services) to engage too closely with 
DWP provision (WPC, 2014). 
Local Jobcentres continue also to deliver or refer service users to a 
range of nationally designed support measures: pre-employment training 
and work experience placements; Work Clubs; self-employment support; 
and the WP. While some options are sourced locally most of the services 
are procured through a national framework with more expensive provision, 
such as mandatory work experience, delivered through prime contractors. 
The national framework excludes many smaller local providers (see Prime 
contractors and the Work Programme below).
A further development has concerned changes to push the employment 
and skills systems together (Simmonds, 2012; Devins, et al., 2011). JCP, for 
example, now screens claimants for basic and English language skills and 
can mandate people to attend courses. It delivers sector-based academies 
with training providers, and the JSA ‘16 hour rule’ which limited the training 
that could be undertaken has been partly relaxed. Much local adult skills 
provision is, however, funded through the Skills Funding Agency (SFA)22 and 
continues to be commissioned separately from welfare to work programmes, 
as does training and advice provision for young people (now procured by the 
Education Funding Agency and National Apprenticeship Service). The result 
is that the commissioning and delivery of skills and employment support 
remains highly complex involving different departments funding programmes 
with varied eligibility criteria, targeting and rewarding different outcomes, 
and delivering across differing geographical areas.
Mainstream welfare to work provision for the unemployed remains 
tightly focused on implementing the benefit regime but DWP Districts and 
Jobcentres can play an important role in seeking better ways to deliver and 
co-ordinate services and to support and work with local partnerships. 
Innovations in service delivery have been strongest when working 
with groups not covered by mandatory requirements and not well served 
by mainstream provision, such as ‘troubled families’, people on disability 
benefits and disadvantaged young people. Two significant service delivery 
aspects concern outreach, with DWP advisory services delivered from over 
1,100 locations, including community centres and prisons, and experiments 
in co-location where, for example, skills, careers and JCP employment 
support are delivered alongside each other. The DWP has also tested ‘co-
design’ pilots where DWP and local Jobcentres worked with local councils 
and other partners and which extended the principles of the earlier Total 
Place initiative (DWP, 2011). These pilots tested different approaches to 
partnership work in co-ordinating mainstream welfare to work provision with 
wraparound services, with most focused on improving employment pathways 
for harder-to-help service users. 
District Managers and specialist Partnership Managers also engage 
strategically with local stakeholders, councils and the LEPs, with the DWP 
often providing information on benefit changes, the nature of the local 
labour market, the profile of workless claimants and the nature of demand 
from employers. DWP Districts are expected also to support the integration 
of employment and skills provision and to co-ordinate partnership priorities 
with the activities of WP prime providers and their subcontractors (DWP, 
2011). The commitment to partnership working is largely voluntary, 
however, and local authorities, and now LEPs, have no direct role in the 
design or commissioning of JCP support and only limited influence on how 
resources are deployed to meet local needs (Wilson and Gallagher, 2013). 
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Prime contractors and the Work Programme
In May 2010, the Coalition Government announced that it would establish 
a single Work Programme to replace some 13 contracted-out employment 
programmes. Ministers suggested that the WP represented a ‘revolution in 
back to work support’ and it is estimated that some 2.2 million participants 
could be assisted over the five-year contract running from 2011 to 2016. 
Before procurement of the WP, the DWP introduced a competition for 
organisations to be included in a ‘framework agreement’.23 This established 
a core of 40 potential prime providers from which the department would 
contract most employment programmes over a four-year period. The 
qualifying conditions for the framework included a commitment to deliver 
services across one or more CPA areas; accept the risk of PbR contracts; 
and have a minimum annual turnover of £20 million. These criteria were 
designed for the WP. They effectively excluded most voluntary organisations 
and local authorities from being prime providers and from bidding for 
contracts subsequently offered under the framework. Some lower value 
DWP contracts have, however, subsequently been commissioned outside 
the framework, allowing smaller providers to compete directly for some 
national provision.
In the subsequent WP competition, 18 prime contractors were selected 
to deliver 40 separate contracts, with two or more primes competing 
in each CPA (NAO, 2012). Prime providers were able to select their 
own subcontractors but were expected to work with supply chains with 
the capacity to meet the needs of the different groups eligible for the 
programme. The largest group are young and long-term unemployed people 
receiving JSA and those claiming Employment and Support Allowance 
(ESA) who are assessed as capable of work-related activity.24 Participation is 
mandatory for most participants, who must undertake the activities agreed 
with their WP provider.
In terms of service delivery, two different prime provider models 
emerged. The first model comprises prime managing agents, providing no 
direct services themselves and delivering all WP activities through a supply 
chain of subcontractors. The other predominant model is the prime delivery 
agent, which combines direct delivery with subcontracting to a supply chain. 
There are wide variations in how much service delivery is subcontracted by 
these primes, often within as well as across regions, ranging from a low of 
15% through to a more typical 30% to 40% of provision. The composition of 
supply chains varies but includes private, voluntary sector and some public 
sector and local authority-related organisations. 
Work Programme contract design and incentives 
The development of the WP has included a series of innovations in the 
design, procurement and delivery of outsourced employment services and 
it has acted as the template for other related national PbR programmes, 
such as those targeted at ex-offenders and troubled families. Many local 
authorities and partnerships have developed their own variants of PbR 
contracts for procuring employment and placement services from providers, 
and it has been suggested that in future the WP funding model could 
be used by the DWP to contract with local authorities or groups of local 
authorities that would act as prime contractors.
The DWP and Treasury negotiated a unique WP funding arrangement 
which supplements core departmental funding (up to £2 billion between 
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2011–12 to 2014–15) with additional Treasury funding released as 
claimants stop claiming benefits (NAO, 2012). This arrangement was 
contingent on Treasury agreement to a WP funding model that was 
intended to ensure higher levels of performance.
The WP funding model includes differential prices, with participants 
divided into nine payment groups, based on age and the benefit the person 
is receiving when they start with the provider. The payment groups act as a 
proxy for the relative employability of participants, with higher prices paid to 
support those furthest from the labour market. 
The payments made to WP contractors have comprised four elements:
•	 An attachment or start payment. This is a small fee of £400 or £600 
paid when a claimant referred from JCP is successfully enrolled on the 
programme. The attachment fee helped with initial cash flow and ceased 
in 2014.
•	 A job outcome payment. Paid when a claimant has been in work for 
either a continuous or cumulative period of employment, of 13 weeks for 
harder-to-place groups and 26 weeks for most JSA claimants. The value 
of job outcome payments for JSA claimant groups is reduced in the later 
years of the contract.
•	 A sustainment outcome payment. A further payment every four 
weeks for keeping a claimant in employment, with up to 26 monthly 
sustainment payments possible for the hardest-to-place groups.
•	 An incentive payment. For jobs delivered beyond a given performance 
level – defined by the DWP as 30% above the number of claimants who 
would have found employment without WP support.
The WP Invitation to Tender set clear performance targets, in terms of the 
number of people getting jobs and keeping them and, when making bids, 
prime providers were able to offer higher levels of performance and offer 
‘price discounts’ on some of the payments. There has been much criticism 
of the basis on which these original performance assumptions were set; 
some observers also argued that the DWP gave too much weight to price 
discounts when it awarded the contracts (WPC, 2013; NAO, 2012).
After the programme commenced, prime contractors were required 
to meet the minimal performance levels set in each CPA or be subject 
to detailed performance improvement plans and ultimately risk losing a 
contract should results not improve.25 A further innovation, adapted from 
the Australian model and intended to intensify competition, has been 
‘market share shifting’, under which the DWP is able to move some 5% of 
new referrals within each CPA from low to high performers. The first such 
changes commenced in ten CPAs in 2013.
Work Programme performance
The implementation of the WP has attracted much criticism and been 
punctuated by negative media coverage about poor performance, the poor 
quality of services for harder-to-place jobseekers and the negative impact 
of the PbR funding model on third-sector and specialist subcontractors. 
Much of the criticism of the WP concerned its failure to meet its first-year 
targets. The position subsequently improved and by 2014 job outcome and 
retention performance for the long-term unemployed was above minimum 
targets, especially for young people aged 18 to 24. Performance remained 
significantly below the Minimum Performance Level (MPL) for disability 
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benefit claimants, however. There were also marked geographical variations 
in WP performance, with results often lowest in local authorities and areas 
within CPAs which have the highest levels of unemployment (CESI, 2014; 
Davies and Raikes, 2014; NAO, 2014).
There are mixed views of how well WP prime contractors have 
performed but systemic flaws in the funding design have emerged, fuelling 
calls for a radical change in 2016 (NAO, 2014). Varied assessments have 
now highlighted the ‘counter-productive’ WP funding regime where, 
because of lower than expected performance, and less income from job 
outcomes, primes have fewer resources to invest in the hardest-to-help 
participants and in high unemployment areas (Riley, et al., 2014; Davies 
and Raikes, 2014). Primes may be able to cross-subsidise their resources 
between the different client payment groups and local areas but they have 
limited incentives to do so. By contrast, it is suggested that local authorities 
and partnerships are better placed and motivated to tackle such inequalities 
if given greater control of the WP and related resources.
The Work Programme, localism and the DWP 
Commissioning Strategy
Prime providers are expected to engage with local partnerships and ensure 
that delivery arrangements reflect local needs. They have flexibility in how 
they do this and, as with JCP, programme accountabilities are vertical to 
the DWP. Local authorities and related partnerships had no formal role in 
the commissioning of the WP or in its oversight, and they are given access 
only to publicly available performance data. The previous government had 
planned to give local authorities a role in co-commissioning the FND but 
after the General Election the new Conservative minister considered that 
too many councils would want to be involved in WP procurement and this 
would be impractical (CLGC, 2011, p. 16). The minister’s expectation was 
that selected prime contractors would want to form partnerships with local 
authorities at local level, but such joint working remains fragmented at best. 
The minister argued that DWP-led ‘localism’ was not about giving powers to 
other organisations but about the centre ‘interfering less’ and giving District 
Managers and prime contractors local flexibility.
In evidence to the House of Commons Communities and Local 
Government Committee, local government representatives were highly 
critical of the way that the DWP designed and procured the WP, arguing 
that organising contracts on a ‘regional’ (CPA) basis was ‘strikingly 
centralised’. The committee itself concluded that government definitions 
of localism were elastic, which had ‘allowed individual departments to adopt 
definitions of localism that suit their policy aims’, with the DWP remaining 
‘notably more centralised than others’. The committee considered that 
while local flexibility in JCP and the WP may be good management practice, 
‘giving centrally controlled civil servants or contractors more freedom is not 
localism but administrative decentralisation’ (CLGC, 2011, p. 3; p. 17).
After a period of consultation in 2014, the DWP published a revised 
Commissioning Strategy that sets the broad framework within which it 
intends to design and procure replacements for its existing contracts, 
including the WP, which are due to stop receiving referrals over the next 
two to three years. The strategy reaffirms the department’s commitment 
to competitive tendering, longer-term contracts and to working centrally 
with  prime  providers that can deliver larger national PbR programmes. It 
also re-commits the DWP to partnership working and to moving to more 
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‘integrated forms of commissioning at the national, sub-national and local 
level, especially to support those furthest from the labour market’ (DWP, 
2014b, p. 23). The department also suggests that local partners may play 
a more significant role in commissioning but, as with other commitments, 
this is expressed in a vague intention to ‘seek assurance from partners 
cited in bids and … seek partners’ input in the performance management 
of contracts’. Despite the stress on partnership working, it is interesting 
to note that the department’s future Commissioning Strategy makes only 
one direct reference to working with LEPs, which briefly considers the role 
these partnerships now have in the procurement, co-commissioning and 
management of ESF-funded provision (DWP, 2014b, p. 13).
local Enterprise Partnerships and local government
A national network of 39 LEPs now constitutes an important part of the 
local delivery landscape in England.26 They are non-statutory bodies which 
cover a self-defined ‘functional economic geography’, have the support 
of business and local government, and are tasked to provide strategic 
leadership and set out economic priorities for their areas. An important part 
of their remit is to ensure the skills system supports local economic growth 
and they are also expected to work with local employers, the DWP and 
learning providers to help workless people into jobs (Ward, 2014, p. 5). LEPs 
are ‘steered’ primarily by the BIS and CLG, and the DWP has little direct 
national involvement.
Varied reviews have identified the ‘pivotal’ importance of the relationship 
between LEPs and their constituent local authorities (which often act as 
‘accountable bodies’ for LEP funding). Six of the largest LEPs (15% of 
the total) are a subset of mayoral and combined authority governance 
arrangements; a third operate as de facto business-led arms-length 
organisations of local authorities’ leaders’ boards;27 with the remainder 
‘finding their way’ and currently sitting beside often newly formed local 
authority leadership structures (Pike, et al., 2013). One review suggests that 
the most effective LEPs inherited their strategy and support system from 
previous area-based economic strategies framed by a RDA sub-regional 
partnership or by a local authority Local Economic Assessment – with many 
such areas retaining already established ESBs as LEP subcommittees.
local Enterprise Partnerships and Growth Deals
The initial development of LEPs was fragmented as they quickly acquired a 
range of responsibilities, including the management of an array of enterprise 
zones, competitive programmes and funds (PAC, 2014a). Their performance 
improved after the award of core funding and their responsibilities have 
further developed following Lord Heseltine’s (2012) No Stone Unturned 
report. This made the case for a major rebalancing of responsibilities for 
economic development between central and local government. The report 
recommended that after a competitive bidding process, LEPs should be given 
control of a large number of budgets amalgamated into single economic 
development-related funding pots for local areas. 
It was envisaged that the budgets to comprise the single pot would total 
£49 billion over four years and that this would include all public funding for 
apprenticeships, adult skills and employment support provision (including all 
contracted-out DWP programmes). The report made no mention of the role 
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of JCP but did suggest the SFA would become redundant. The government 
accepted many of the Heseltine Report’s recommendations but the 
annual £2 billion ‘single pot’ Local Growth Fund introduced is smaller than 
anticipated, with critics reporting that elements of the fund remain heavily 
constrained by central departmental requirements (Pike, et al., 2013).
LEP spending priorities and budgets are shaped by two strategic 
documents which they have to produce. In these documents, the 
British Government and European Commission require LEPs to analyse 
local circumstances, articulate their strategies and identify growth and 
employment-related priorities. 
The key requirement for LEPs is to develop multi-year Strategic 
Economic Plans. These form the basis on which they have negotiated Local 
Growth Deals with central government and which will commence delivery 
in April 2015. The methodology for Growth Deals builds on the approach 
towards City Deals which some LEPs and local authorities had already agreed 
with central government (see City Deals and Community Budgets below). In 
these negotiations, LEPs sought ‘freedoms, flexibilities and influence’ and 
‘new levers’ through which to shape and better co-ordinate local growth 
strategies and the delivery of national programmes. In return, central 
government required ‘commitments’ from LEPs, local authorities and the 
private sector; a demonstration of their organisational capacity; and provision 
of ‘a strong rationale and compelling’ performance offer as expected in the 
City Deal process (HMG, 2013). 
The other strategic LEP planning requirement concerns their 
responsibility to guide the delivery of an estimated £5 billion in EU Structural 
and Investment Funds for 2014–2020.28 European funding will be 
distributed alongside the Local Growth Fund, giving LEPs flexibility to use 
resources on combined or complementary activities. These European funds 
will play an important role in shaping much of the discretionary funding 
available to local authorities and the voluntary sector for investing in skills 
and employment programmes for workless residents.
Skills funding has remained largely centralised but LEPs have been given 
levers which should allow them to exercise ‘real influence’ over vocational 
education and skills providers in meeting perceived business needs (BIS, 
2013). LEP influence on DWP programmes is less direct but the DWP is 
committed to assisting LEPs to develop their strategic plans and to working 
with them through its Jobcentre network. This builds on the department’s 
existing joint activity with LEPs organised through City Deals.
City Deals and Community Budgets
LEP development overlapped with the introduction of other government 
approaches to devolving control over budgets to cities and local authorities. 
City Deals and Community Budgets have both been designed to pool 
previously separate funding streams but City Deals (as with LEP Growth 
Deals) take the form of agreements brokered with central government 
while Community Budgets are designed to more directly facilitate local joint 
working between public bodies.
The government’s approach to City Deals was set out in ‘Unlocking 
growth in cities’ (CO, 2011), which signalled it was ‘open to bold ideas 
and a genuine transfer of power’. The proposition was that cities could be 
given powers and freedoms relating to economic growth, infrastructure 
development, housing and planning, skills and employment, in return for 
commitments to deliver better results on local growth and jobs. It was 
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envisaged that deals would be made with cities that had strong governance 
and accountability structures and which planned their priorities with the 
private sector, and that the cities should be prepared to risk their own 
resources as well as ‘reap rewards’.29 
Individual City Deals were brokered in negotiation with the Treasury. 
A specialist inter-departmental Cities Unit provided advice to cities and 
negotiated the proposed deals and ‘asks’ with individual departments, with 
one team specialising in proposals concerning ‘work and skills’. 
The first wave of City Deals was agreed with the eight core cities and 
their LEPs in 2012. Their published format is similar, with each deal divided 
into economic development themes under which the partnership outlines its 
targets and summarises the actions and commitments of the city alongside 
parallel commitments from central departments. In return for the greater 
control and funds awarded, the eight cities committed to actions expected 
to create 175,000 jobs and 37,000 new apprenticeships over two decades. 
Two of the deals were led by the LEP, the others by local authorities. A 
further 20 areas were invited to negotiate individual deals during 2013–14; 
some were agreed and others superseded by LEP-led Growth Deals.
The Community Budget approach to devolution is different. The focus 
has been on giving local public services greater freedom to use existing 
powers to work together to ‘improve outcomes, join up services and reduce 
duplication and waste’ (CLGC, 2013). The approach was initially tested by 
the CLG on pilots that aimed at drawing together the services of agencies 
involved in working with families with multiple problems.30 A second wave of 
Community Budgets tested neighbourhood and ‘whole place’ approaches. In 
the ‘whole place’ pilots, four local authority partnerships were selected after 
a competitive process. In each area, local authority staff worked with central 
government officials on selected themes to produce full business cases each 
setting out the problem being tackled, the proposed new delivery model and 
the return public bodies might expect for their investment, supported by 
a rigorous cost benefit analysis (NAO, 2013a). The ‘whole place’ pilots had 
varied objectives but each considered economic growth and employment 
and proposed significant changes in the local design and delivery of aspects 
of skills and welfare to work provision.
The pilot ‘whole place’ programme ended in October 2012 with the 
publication of local business cases. Each pilot area identified how improved 
co-ordination and delivery of services would produce significant savings 
and improvements in outcomes. The areas generally planned to implement 
their proposals within existing structures and using existing powers but 
they highlighted a number of issues on which continued local and national 
leadership and collaboration were deemed necessary. These issues included 
practical measures within existing structures, for example, encouraging data 
sharing between public bodies, and dialogue around potential longer-term 
and systemic reforms, including financial incentives for partners to invest in 
public service reform across organisational boundaries (NAO, 2013a).31 
If fully implemented, the impact of community budgets may be significant. 
The LGA commissioned a study from Ernst and Young (2013) to assess 
potential savings if the estimates given by the pilot areas could be rolled out 
and obtained by other local authorities. The study made important caveats – 
these were estimates not actual savings – but suggested that the projected 
net benefit from proposed changes in the delivery of health and social care, 
support to families with complex needs and integration of work and skills 
over five years was between £9.4 billion and £20.6 billion. Potential annual 
‘steady state’ net benefits from the ‘work and skills’ proposals alone would 
amount to between £1 billion and £1.7 billion. The LGA has used the report’s 
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findings to reinforce the case both for devolution and for local government 
being given a greater share in the savings generated by such locally driven 
service delivery reforms. It was pointed out, for example, that while councils 
would make greater investments, 85% of the net benefit savings would flow 
directly to the DWP, as would a significant portion of the 15% savings on 
programme expenditure. 
‘Work and skills’ services developed through local 
partnership deals
It was not possible, within the terms of this research project, to undertake 
a detailed review of the varied ‘work and skills’ proposals in the City Deals, 
Community Budgets and Growth Deals. A rapid scrutiny of those available 
online in June 2014 reveals varied proposals arising from an analysis of key 
challenges facing local areas around low skill levels, youth and long-term 
unemployment, ‘inactive’ welfare caseloads, and poor opportunities for 
in-work progression. The proposals combine unique elements, related to 
the circumstances and growth opportunities in each area, alongside more 
common proposals reflecting the shared challenges faced by cities and LEPs. 
The proposals are structured in ways that complement or supplement, rather 
than radically change, mainstream employment and skills programmes. 
One common theme is the commitment to increase the number of 
apprenticeships available and to reduce the Not in Education, Employment 
or Training (NEET) population and youth unemployment. Proposed 
interventions include improving school to work transitions and careers 
advice, combined with the development of apprenticeship or youth 
employment ‘hubs’ that would, in some cities, involve co-location of relevant 
services. These youth-related strategies aim to better co-ordinate existing 
fragmented provision delivered through an estimated 40 separate funding 
streams. The youth focus was boosted previously when the eight core cities 
were given the opportunity to draw on central funds made available because 
of a significant underspend in the DWP-delivered national Youth Contract 
budget. By contrast, however, only three core cities were invited to deliver 
the separate Department for Education PbR Youth Contract provision for 
16 and 17 year olds, with the bulk of the programme in England delivered 
by six prime contractors in twelve regional ‘lots’. An evaluation subsequently 
reported little variance in performance and that there was ‘remarkable 
consistency’ in the types of support offered to 16 and 17 years olds by local 
councils and prime contractors (Newton, et al., 2014).
Another theme concerns giving local employers, through the LEP and/or 
an ESB, more influence and control over skills funding, with new approaches 
aimed at increasing the availability and targeting of apprenticeships, including 
their take-up by small- and medium-sized enterprises (City Growth 
Commission, 2014). Some projects propose the devolution of aspects of 
SFA skills funding to local partnerships with which they plan to commission 
services with contracts that would include a greater emphasis on rewarding 
providers for placing people in sustained employment in addition to securing 
qualifications.
A third ‘work and skills’ theme provides for greater partnership working, 
allowing cities to create joint structures and enhanced options around 
Jobcentre services and DWP-contracted provision. In Newcastle, for 
example, this includes a long-term commitment by the local authority and 
the DWP District to a joint service working with harder-to-place residents. 
In this co-located service, front-line advisers focus on securing longer-
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term outcomes ‘rather than trying to move people off benefits as soon as 
possible’.32 Many deals also include commitments to test and develop new 
programme approaches for ESA claimants, especially those who remain on 
benefits after exiting the WP.
City and Growth Deals and Welfare to Work devolution
The next phase in welfare to work and skills devolution is being anticipated 
in the varied proposals that have been developed to support the City Deals 
and Growth Deals. The core cities, and London in particular, have articulated 
longer-term ambitions; the interim innovations and programmes being 
tested through the deal process are seen as pathways to greater welfare to 
work devolution.
This longer-term ambition is especially clear in the approach of 
the Greater Manchester Combined Authority. Through the City Deal, 
Community Budget and bilateral agreements, the authority has developed 
a series of innovations intended as a prelude to further welfare to work 
devolution. The ambition is to develop and deliver more integrated and 
effective welfare to work services shaped by findings from co-designed 
experimental pilots, undertaken with the DWP and others.33 The first aspect 
concerns pilots that will reduce the high number of residents claiming 
ESA by reducing the inflow, through a Fit to Work Service, and increase 
the outflow into employment, with enhancements to the WP (intended to 
inform the co-design of DWP WP contracts for 2016).34 A second theme 
is to improve learning pathways, qualifications and work opportunities for 
young people, particularly those not in employment or training, and includes 
a proposal to test a ‘qualifications outcome payment’ with WP providers. A 
third theme is to increase progression in the labour market for low-skilled 
people, especially those who have had repeated spells on JSA and who now 
claim UC. Related service delivery themes include further co-location and 
the development of ‘employment, benefits and skills hubs’ across the city; 
improved data matching; and testing earlier more in-depth assessment of 
claimants (which will require co-operation from the DWP). This strategy 
culminated in the ‘Greater Manchester Agreement’ brokered between HM 
Treasury and the Combined Authority which, among other things, commits 
to giving Manchester control of some skills budgets and an expanded 
Working Well pilot, with an ‘opportunity’ to be a joint commissioner with the 
DWP for the next phase of the WP (HMT-GMCA, 2014, p.1).
London Councils (2013) and the London LEP (2014) have also made 
detailed cases outlining how devolution of welfare to work could be 
implemented. In its Growth Plan for London, the LEP made ambitious 
proposals to overcome the barriers and complexity created by national 
commissioning35 and enable the development of ‘clear journeys between 
welfare and work’, multi-agency wraparound services, and targeted support 
for the hardest to help. The LEP proposed that it be given control of a 
‘single employment services pot’ to devolve to multi-borough Employment 
Support Units (ESUs) through a needs-based funding formula. The LEP 
would be responsible for agreeing ESU plans, performance management, 
labour market intelligence, and brokering relationships with major London 
employers.
The proposed ‘single pot’ would include all the DWP and skills budgets 
earmarked in the earlier Heseltine Report, devolved progressively as 
national contracts came to an end. The pot would eventually be comprised 
of co-commissioned mainstream funding (between DWP and the ESUs) 
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and targeted funds which would be devolved fully, such as LSSF funds. 
The ESUs would bring employment and skills provision across London into 
one governance and management system that would embed ‘sustainable 
employment and progression at the heart of all commissioning and 
employment delivery’ (London LEP, 2014, p. 115).
The London LEP proposed an interim strategy prior to full devolution and 
the formal Growth Deal agreed in 2014 appears to support the approach. 
The most significant element concerns a large-scale pilot, to be tested in 
four areas, which targets support at ESA WP leavers (similar to the approach 
being tested in Manchester and also agreed for some other LEP areas). The 
intention is to test London’s capacity to deliver ‘at significant scale’ and, if 
successful, will ‘unlock a series of progressive steps towards further local 
service integration’ and ‘open discussions on ways for London Government 
to play a greater role’ in the design and commissioning ‘of the next phase of 
(DWP) employment support programmes’ (CO and DPM, 2014, p. 6).
Conclusion – proposals for future welfare to work 
devolution in England
The period from 2010 has been characterised by continuing flux in welfare 
to work policy settings with local government stakeholders seeking greater 
control so that they may develop employment, skills and related welfare to 
work services in ways that better meet the needs of their local economies 
and residents. The most important processes through which local authorities 
have been able to exercise influence have been in their partnerships with 
LEPs and through related Growth Deals, City Deals and Community Budgets. 
Through these mechanisms, stakeholders have started to identify local 
priorities and better ways to co-ordinate fragmented services and pool or 
align budgets to potentially improve outcomes and cost effectiveness. 
Considerable momentum has developed around aspects of welfare to 
work devolution but it has to be stressed that much ‘deal’-related activity to 
date concerns planning rather than implementation and delivery. Research 
with representatives from the core cities has found, for example, that 
post-City Deal negotiations with at least some departments are ‘slow and 
resource intensive’. There was praise for the efforts of the Treasury-based 
Cities Unit, but in negotiations, cities have reported that some ‘departments 
focused their efforts on proving cities wrong rather than working with them 
to develop their ideas’ (CfC, 2013, p. 3). A careful reading of the agreed 
deals reveals also highly conditional commitments given by ministers, the 
DWP, funding agencies and other central government departments, and 
it remains to be seen how local innovation and development will translate 
into greater devolution and wider changes in employment support and skills 
service delivery. As it is, there continue to be marked variations in how DWP 
providers, JCP Districts and individual Jobcentres engage with partnerships, 
councils and local employers, with positive partnership working in some local 
areas contrasting with more negative experiences elsewhere. 
Slow progress has not dampened demands for more rapid and extensive 
reform, with many of the largest local authorities viewing the local 
welfare programmes they are developing as stepping stones to a more 
radical devolution. Particular emphasis has been placed on options for 
major changes to the WP when current contracts end in 2016, including 
‘devolution’ of how it is commissioned and managed. Most interventions 
envisage future commissioning of the WP on LEP and combined authority 
boundaries with co-commissioning by local authorities. Among these 
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proposals, the Institute for Public Policy Research has outlined a strategy 
for devolution of the WP and DWP provision which would offer local 
councils different options according to their appetite for change and 
capacity to deliver and take on risk (Davies and Raikes, 2014; Lawton, et al., 
2014). This echoes the Labour Party’s framework, if elected, for devolving 
commissioning of the WP and skills budgets to LEPs and city-county regions 
(Timms, 2014).36 
The Jobcentre network remains at the centre of local welfare to work 
services and proposals from local government stakeholders focus most on 
securing improved co-ordination. This includes policies that would promote 
greater joint working, including co-commissioning and co-location of 
local services, with the 23-strong Key Cities (2014) proposing also that 
Jobcentres (and other public bodies) be given a ‘duty to co-operate’ with 
local authorities to better align local services. Only the County Councils 
Network has explicitly proposed merging JCP with council services, as 
part of a ‘whole-place approach’, although its programme for the next 
government offers no further detail on what this might entail (CCN, 2014).
Radical options for Jobcentre and benefit devolution have been outlined 
by several think tanks, but most involve further marketisation rather 
than local control of employment support.37 ResPublica, by contrast, has 
proposed a radical Devo-Max approach to future public service delivery 
in English cities, which envisages full devolution of JCP and the benefit 
system. It proposes that this process should commence with Manchester, 
with its ‘well-evidenced growth potential and mature governance structures’ 
(Blond and Morrin, 2014, p. 2). The ambition is that within five years from 
the start of the next parliament, Greater Manchester should receive a full 
place-based settlement for its entire proportion of public spend, including 
welfare benefits, with powers to reinvest fiscal savings generated through 
reform. Manchester should be ‘immediately empowered’ to further develop 
its localised welfare to work services and by 2020, all DWP employment 
programmes should be devolved and JCP ‘brought under local control’.
An earlier Policy Exchange report proposed a variant more analogous to 
the model of welfare to work devolution in the Netherlands, under which 
English cities would be encouraged to bid for greater autonomy over the 
functioning of Jobcentres and employment programmes. Under these 
proposals cities could be awarded and be given a ‘duty of care’ for benefit 
spending for whole groups of individuals with ‘entire estates being put in the 
hands of cities’ (Tinsley, 2013, p. 9). Total expected benefit spending for a 
group of individuals over a given period would be transferred, incentivising 
cities to invest in more flexible and integrated back to work services by 
allowing them to keep any benefit savings accrued from helping additional 
people back into employment.
In making the case for more powers, local government and other 
stakeholders have frequently cited the experience of other countries 
where devolution has been associated with falling welfare caseloads and 
expenditure and improved employment outcomes. The following chapter 
considers briefly lessons on welfare to work devolution from four countries 
frequently cited in UK debates.
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4 WElFARE TO WORK 
DEvOlUTiOn in 
CAnADA, ThE USA, 
GERmAnY AnD ThE 
nEThERlAnDS
This chapter briefly reviews welfare to work 
devolution in four countries cited frequently in the 
UK literature: Canada, the USA, the Netherlands and 
Germany.
There has been a strong trend towards welfare to work devolution and 
decentralisation in Europe and other OECD countries (Mosley, 2011; Froy, 
et al., 2011). Advocates of such devolution in the UK highlight international 
exemplars where such reforms have been associated with reductions in 
benefit caseloads, public expenditure reductions and increased employment. 
The examples chosen each illustrate aspects of policy and practice that give 
insights into how welfare to work policy has been devolved and the impact of 
such reforms on the delivery and integration of front-line services.
Welfare to work devolution and the case-study countries
Much of the international literature on welfare to work devolution is 
concerned with two patterns of decentralisation through which aspects 
of policy responsibility have been devolved. The first concerns devolution 
of responsibility for employment, skills and welfare policy to the regional 
or provincial level, especially in the federal states of North America. The 
second concerns new patterns of policy responsibility for social assistance 
and the long-term unemployed between the national PES and municipal 
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government, especially in Europe. These different approaches have 
characterised reforms in the four case-study countries where lower, more 
autonomous tiers of government play a more central role in implementation 
and, in some cases, policy formation. Table 3 gives brief details of the 
rationale for and scope of devolution in the four countries, which are 
considered in more detail in the following sections. 
Each of the countries reviewed has two distinct systems of income 
support for working-age people, although levels of adequacy and coverage 
vary. Each country has an unemployment insurance system covering people 
in regular employment, funded mainly by employee and/or employer 
contributions. This typically provides time-limited unemployment benefits. 
Each country also has a minimum income system that provides a means-
tested safety net of income support for households that do not qualify for, 
or who exhaust, their insurance-based entitlements, with work requirements 
for people judged capable of work. These benefits are delivered by various 
organisations which are connected with a range of public and private 
organisations delivering employment, training and other welfare to work 
services.
In each of the four comparator countries, different types of political 
devolution and co-ordination have been motivated by a range of factors 
and implemented within different national traditions, benefit systems and 
socio-economic contexts. They have also been implemented through varied 
funding and performance frameworks, ranging from the full devolution of 
budgets to the co-financing of co-located services. 
Developments in Canada and the USA have already attracted British 
interest, with US welfare and workforce development reforms having had 
significant influence on policy development (Waldfogel, 2010; Dolowitz, 
1998). In both these countries, the devolution of employment and skills 
programmes has been through negotiated agreements, while the approach 
to welfare has been more radical, with block grants replacing federal 
matched funding for entitlement-based programmes. These block grants 
give lower tiers of government great discretion and related welfare to work 
reforms have been associated with significant caseload reductions.
In the European municipal cases, devolution reforms have been largely 
driven by an increased emphasis on the activation of long-term unemployed 
or inactive social assistance recipients. 
In Germany and the Netherlands this led to policy-driven organisational 
changes creating decentralised delivery systems for activation and welfare 
to work services. In the German local joint agencies, this has taken the 
form of mandated co-operation between municipal social services and PES 
branch offices. In the Netherlands and the 110 separate German ‘opt out’ 
municipalities, responsibility lies with local government.
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Table 3: Decentralisation of employment services in Canada, the USA, the 
netherlands and Germany: type, reasons and degree
Canada USA netherlands Germany
Decentralisation 
type 
•  Regionalisation 
(Federalism: 13 
PESs in provinces 
and territories)
•  Intergovernmental 
agreements
•  Regionalisation 
(Federalism: 50 states)
•  Statutory federal-
state-local 
partnerships
•  Statutory
•  About 400 
municipalities; 
all uninsured 
claimants
•  National PES 
for insured 
unemployed
•  Statutory
•  About 430 joint 
PES-municipal 
or fully devolved 
municipal 
agencies for 
basic-income 
recipients
•  National PES 
for insured 
unemployed 
What has been 
decentralised?
Employment 
services for insured 
and uninsured 
unemployed and 
social assistance 
benefits (a)
Employment services 
and benefits for all 
unemployed and for 
those on ‘temporary 
assistance’ (b)
Employment 
services and 
benefits for social 
assistance clients
Employment 
services and 
benefits for 
the long-term 
unemployed
Reasons for 
decentralisation
Federalism; also 
regional/ethnic 
tensions (c)
Federalism; flexible and 
locally based delivery 
system; facilitation of 
local co-operation/ one-
stop-shops in multi-level 
governance
Activation of 
social assistance 
clients; integration 
of employment 
services
Activation of 
social assistance 
clients; integration 
of employment 
services 
Regional or 
municipal 
flexibility in 
employment 
service delivery
High: Provincial 
government can 
formulate policy 
and shape design 
and delivery of 
employment services. 
Separate federal 
funding stream for 
insured unemployed. 
Province has full 
discretion over 
social assistance 
and welfare to work 
services, which are 
block grant funded.
Medium/high: Flexibility 
in programme design 
and delivery and in 
allocating funds for 
employment services. 
National eligibility, 
performance, reporting 
and administrative 
requirements. Higher 
flexibility under 
Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families 
(social assistance) 
compared to the 
Workforce Investment 
Act insured and other 
unemployed.
Medium/high: 
Municipalities in 
own Jobcentres 
have full 
management 
flexibility over 
programmes, 
delivery and 
resource allocation 
for employment 
services but are 
subject to strong 
financial incentives 
not to exceed 
their expenditure 
ceiling for social 
assistance benefits. 
(d)
Low: (joint 
agencies) (e) 
PES is a highly 
centralised 
national agency 
and dominant 
partner. Local 
budgets are 
flexible and 
programme mix 
is locally decided. 
10% of funds can 
in principle be 
used for innovative 
programmes not 
in pre-defined 
national menu. 
Some flexibility in 
work organisation 
but follows PES.
Source: derived from Annex 1, Parts A and B, Mosley, 2011, with limited updating and editing
Notes 
a  Federal entitlement rules on social assistance came to an end in 1996, and benefits and services are now an 
exclusive provincial responsibility, although the provinces still receive a block grant towards the cost of social 
assistance. 
b  There are three legal instruments and various federal-state matched funding streams for (1) placement 
services and UI benefits for insured unemployed; (2) Workforce Investment Boards for labour market training 
for disadvantaged and redundant workers and (3) welfare to work services for people, mostly lone-parent 
heads of households on Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
c  Administrative devolution driven by federal funding crisis and by secession campaigns in Quebec.
d  They must finance higher expenditure out of their own budgets and are free to use any surplus for other 
municipal purposes. This is supposed to give them an incentive to control expenditure and to conform with 
the government’s ‘work before benefits’ policy. 
e  National performance targets for PES negotiated at local level with municipalities who are part of joint 
agencies. Municipalities retain control over their own employees and joint agencies can outsource at their own 
discretion. National performance targets for 110 ‘opt out’ municipalities are negotiated with the regional state 
government which negotiates municipal targets.
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Welfare to work devolution in Canada
In Canada, political events as well as major economic developments in the 
1990s combined to produce a transformation in federal and provincial 
responsibilities for organising and financing social assistance, unemployment 
insurance, employment services and labour market programmes. 
In 1996, federal match funding of safety-net social assistance payments 
was replaced by a block grant which cut funding levels while giving provinces 
and territories scope to introduce work-based eligibility requirements. At 
the same time, a passive system of unemployment benefit was replaced by 
Employment Insurance (EI) which has tighter eligibility rules and stricter 
job search requirements. Funding of federal employment and training 
services for the insured unemployed was gradually devolved to provinces 
and territories. The reforms were designed to increase the availability of 
employment services for those eligible for EI and to ensure that claimants 
entered employment swiftly. 
Although provinces and territories have some flexibility, EI continues to 
be funded from contributions and is controlled by the federal government. EI 
benefit is time-limited and designed to provide only temporary assistance. It 
is administered through Service Canada, a national agency providing multiple 
service channels with a priority given to online application, reporting and job 
matching facilities. Service Canada also has a national network of in-person 
services, including outreach sites and some larger one-stop centres, through 
which it delivers a number of federal programmes. Provinces and territories 
are responsible for delivering and determining social assistance eligibility 
rules.
Devolution of social assistance and the National Child Benefit
Between the 1960s and 1980s, the federal government of Canada had 
funded social assistance as a demand-led programme. It matched provincial 
or territorial expenditure at a dollar-for-dollar rate while also ensuring 
comparable quality across provinces. Social assistance caseloads increased in 
the 1980s and between 1990 and 1994 grew by a further 55%, peaking at 
over 3 million beneficiaries (Kneebone and White, 2014, Table 1). Matched 
federal funding and entitlement rules were considered to be ‘conducive to 
rising expenditures’ (Gray, 2003). The federal government initially sought to 
place a cap on the spending of the largest provinces but in 1996 replaced 
the earlier system with a largely unconditional block grant. In doing so, the 
federal government removed requirements concerning social assistance 
benefit rates and eligibility, and after devolution, provinces were given 
freedom to introduce work-based conditionality rules and to develop welfare 
to work programmes.38
Initially, the block grant included funding for health and social services, 
but from 2004 a separate Canada Social Transfer (CST) grant provided 
federal funding for support for children, post-secondary education and 
other social programmes including social assistance. The payment of CST to 
provinces and territories takes the form of a cash grant and local tax revenue 
with regional allocations determined on a simple per capita basis, but within a 
complex equalisation formula (Gauthier, 2012). The CST budget is notionally 
allocated to broad categories of spending but there is no federal oversight 
or reporting system for assessing or evaluating how the transferred funding 
is used or the effects of the spending (CASW, 2012). The block grant is not 
based on any needs assessment or measure of adequacy but since 2007 has 
been increased by 3% per annum.   
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Another factor contributing to increased employment rates, especially of 
lone parents, was the introduction of a means-tested National Child Benefit 
(NCB) in 1997. This was designed to supplement an existing ‘core’ Child 
Tax Benefit by giving poor families greater work incentives, and provinces 
and territories increased capacity to provide work-enabling services. 
Provinces and territories are free to reduce their social assistance rates to 
reflect the NCB payment to non-working families but may only spend the 
funds generated by these deductions on services and benefits that share 
the legislative work incentive and child poverty reduction goals of the 
supplement (HRSDC, 2013a). 
Labour Market Development Agreements and Labour Market 
Agreements
The Canadian Ministry implemented devolution of EI-funded employment 
and training programmes for the unemployed through a different process of 
Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs). The initial agreements 
were either co-managed or devolved. In the co-managed variant, the 
province or territory and the federal department shared responsibility for 
labour market activities. In the devolved situation, the province or territory 
had sole responsibility for the design and delivery of interventions. Since 
February 2010, all LMDAs have been fully devolved (O’Leary, et al., 2011; 
Froy, et al., 2011). The agreements provided not only for a transfer of 
funding, but also for the transfer of federal staff and assets to the provincial 
and territorial governments, with those federal staff remaining in Service 
Canada often co-located with provincial services (Mosley, 2012). In addition 
to EI administration, the federal government retained responsibility for 
pan-Canadian programmes, related, for example, to youth, migration and 
aboriginal peoples.
The 1996 legislation specified the types of programmes that could be 
financed from EI funds, ranging from job search support through to skills 
training, but the LMDAs allowed provinces considerable scope in the design 
and blend of their services. The legislation required also that the agreements 
should be ‘results based’ and incorporate an evaluation of outcomes. Early 
‘formative’ evaluations assessed process and operational issues involved 
in the transfer, such as governance, access and the development of joint 
‘single-window’ services. ‘Summative’ evaluations were published after three 
years and assessed the longer-term impacts and cost effectiveness of the 
services and programmes delivered. Thereafter, evaluations are expected 
to be undertaken as a regular feature within each wave of LMDAs (Rymes, 
2003).
The federal department developed new results-based indicators for 
LMDAs, with each agreement containing annual numerical targets for 
participants served and for benefit savings secured for the EI fund. The 
primary performance indicator concerns the number of participants who 
obtain employment after programme participation. Although some of the 
performance parameters are negotiated, they are mostly determined by 
federal government (Froy, et al., 2011, p. 25). Provinces and territories 
must submit financial statements and report on their performance in annual 
reports. LMDA performance management is designed to enable federal 
managers to track progress, measure outcomes and support evaluation, with 
lower tiers supplementing core performance management requirements 
with their own provincial or territorial indicators.
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The LMDAs also require provinces and territories to:
•	 promote co-operation and partnership with labour market partners, such 
as employers and community-based organisations;
•	 feature local decision-making;
•	 eliminate unnecessary overlap and duplication; and
•	 encourage individuals to take personal responsibility for finding 
employment.
As LMDAs are funded from insurance contributions, the C$1.95 billion 
annual budget can be spent only on services for the 37% of unemployed 
Canadians who qualify for EI. In 2007, the federal government introduced a 
further six-year federal-provincial partnership – Labour Market Agreement 
(LMA) – designed to ‘supplement’ existing provincial employment services 
for the uninsured unemployed. The LMA budget was C$500m a year, and 
the funds have been used for employment services, basic skills and training 
programmes targeted at low-skilled workers and the uninsured unemployed, 
including some social assistance recipients. The LMAs were also structured 
as performance agreements, providing regular reports on outcomes and 
subject to formative and summative evaluation (HRSDC, 2013b). LMA funds 
were allocated by the federal government on a per capita basis, in contrast to 
LMDAs, under which funding was distributed based on historical allocations 
and labour market variables (Froy, et al., 2011, p. 44).
There are specific federal-provincial agreements targeted at older 
workers and disabled persons, and a separate federal Youth Employment 
Strategy. Additional federal funding was also distributed through short-
term agreements in response to the impact of the global financial crisis on 
unemployment. In total, some 85% of federal employment and training funds 
are distributed through the various agreements (Froy, et al., 2011, p. 18).
Each province and territory has its own separate governance and delivery 
arrangements, reflecting different political and policy choices. In Ontario, 
for example, the last province to take over full control, a unified Ministry of 
Training, Colleges and Universities is responsible for delivery of employment 
and training services through Employment Ontario (OECD, 2014b). This 
delivery network is comprised of 170 contracted providers – public, private 
and non-profit – which manage over 400 service delivery locations through 
which they provide self-service and supported job search and provide 
referrals to other services. The ministry controls policy centrally but takes 
advice from a separate network of 25 Workforce Planning Boards. These 
boards include employers and promote partnership activity and initiatives 
aimed at tackling local needs.
In 2013, the federal government unilaterally announced a major 
‘centralising’ reform to the Labour Market Agreements, provoking a one-
year ‘stand-off’ between federal and provincial governments (Mendelson 
and Zon, 2013). A large part of the LMA budget, which was to be renewed 
from 2014–15, was to be devoted to a new Canada Job Grant, targeted at 
meeting employer skill needs and to be co-funded equally by the employer, 
federal and provincial/territory government. After much debate, so-called 
Job Fund Agreements now protect more of the previous LMA funding at 
risk for harder-to-place recipients and provide greater flexibility in the terms 
of the new grant (with no provincial or territorial contribution, and reduced 
contribution rates for small employers). 
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The impacts of welfare to work devolution in Canada
The evaluations of the various federal Labour Market Agreements show that 
they have acted as the catalyst for provinces and territories to integrate 
the delivery of employment and training provision, with evaluations finding 
the creation of a more ‘seamless service for clients’. The formative studies 
of LMDAs exposed some short-term and some enduring implementation 
problems requiring adjustments in partnerships, work processes and 
accountability structures. They also show that the process of integration 
demanded, at least initially, a ‘large investment of time and energy from 
all involved’ (Rymes, 2003, p. 183). A synthesis of many of the individual 
studies reported that over the past decade, the federal agreements had 
given provinces and territories flexibility through which they had been 
able to design and adapt cost-effective services in response to changing 
circumstances (O’Leary, et al., 2011).39
The agreements also established a distinctive approach to accountability, 
including performance reporting and evaluation requirements targeted at 
measuring immediate and longer-term outcomes. In the first agreements 
provinces and territories were required to work with federal representatives 
in Joint Evaluation Committees, which prepared and signed off an evaluation 
framework, undertook evaluations, and approved third-party evaluation 
contracts and evaluation reports. There were also formal agreements on 
information and data sharing that outline how each party should co-operate, 
analyse, produce, disseminate and use labour market information to support 
economic development (consistent with a nationally defined labour market 
information methodology).
The system has some significant weaknesses, however. The federal 
reporting requirements on LMDAs are less detailed than those for LMAs, and 
it is difficult to make inter-regional comparisons of performance because 
of variations and inconsistencies in how services, results and outcomes 
are reported (CHBA, 2012). The funding formula for the distribution of 
insurance-based LMDA resources has also not been updated and is ‘based 
on decades-old assessments of provincial need’ (Mendelson, 2012, p. 16). 
Analysts suggest the allocations and eligibility rules have not kept pace with 
labour market and population changes; some suggest that consequently, 
low-skilled and uninsured unemployed people who need services are 
ineligible and provinces such as Ontario get a lower share of resources than 
their level of unemployment might suggest (Mendelson and Zon, 2013).
There are no official federal evaluations of the impact of devolved 
social assistance on poverty or of the direct contribution it made to falling 
caseloads and increased employment after implementation (Kneebone 
and White, 2014). Caseload reductions were particularly strong in the late 
1990s, when the combination of tightened work-based eligibility rules, 
rate cuts and a strong economy saw the number of beneficiaries fall from 
a peak of over 3 million to less than 2 million in 2001, while aggregate 
social assistance expenditure fell from C$14.3 billion in 1994 to C$10.4 
billion in 2001 (Lightman, et al., 2010). The lone parent employment rate 
increased by 19% between 1998 and 2003 and the number of beneficiaries 
continued to fall to a low point of 1.64 million in 2008 (Crisp and Fletcher, 
2008; Kneebone and White, 2014). Although family income increased for 
most welfare leavers, it declined for a third; detailed provincial studies found 
that while the majority of leavers entered full-time stable jobs, many of the 
jobs were low paid and significant minorities worked part time or recycled 
into the welfare system after periods in casual, temporary and seasonal 
employment (Lightman, et al., 2010). 
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Recent assessments show that the coverage and value of social 
assistance payment rates has fallen since 1996, relative to low-income 
thresholds calculated by Statistics Canada. Although work requirements are 
now common, there have been significant differences in provincial policy 
choices, with British Colombia the only one to introduce US-style time limits 
in 2002. Some analysts argue that a trend towards harsher policy choices 
has been exacerbated by inter-provincial competition which has contributed 
to ‘a significant downwards convergence of both caseloads and costs’ 
(Wood, 2013). Concerns about the reduced coverage of social assistance 
have prompted the demand of anti-poverty campaigns for the introduction 
of minimum Canada-wide standards on eligibility and adequacy and for an 
accountability mechanism that requires devolved governments to explain 
how federal funding is spent and the impact it has (CASW, 2012). 
Welfare to work devolution in the USA
The devolution of the US welfare to work and employment services 
system has been shaped by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) (1998) 
and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) (1996). These federal programmes are managed by separate 
departments at the national (and often the state) levels, with the Department 
of Labor (DoL) responsible for WIA and the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) responsible for welfare reform. The WIA legislation 
created a structured federal model for the decentralised delivery and co-
ordination of employment and training services. The PRWORA legislation 
introduced more radical devolution with the replacement of a national 
entitlement programme by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
This replaced an open-ended federal matching grant with a block grant and 
gave states power to shape their own welfare to work systems.
The local workforce development system and one-stop centres
The US WIA workforce development system is a partnership between three 
levels of government – federal, state and local (OECD, 2014c). Key goals of 
the WIA were to streamline services, create greater accountability, and give 
state and local government more flexibility in procuring employment and 
training services (Bradley, 2013).
The decentralised system places most of the responsibility for the actual 
delivery of training and employment support services at the local level. 
The legislation required each state governor to establish and appoint the 
membership of local Workforce Investment Boards (WIB), of which there 
are some 600. Each board has majority employer membership (at least 51%) 
and is chaired by a business leader. They are also expected to include leaders 
from other relevant organisations, including local government, economic 
development and trade unions. Board composition varies but may include up 
to 50 members, and with multiple subcommittees, governance arrangements 
are often cumbersome. 
WIBs are organised either at city or county level, although states with 
smaller populations often have a single state-wide board. Local WIBs are 
usually an extension of a local government unit, typically at county or city 
level, and local governments may form partnerships through inter-local 
agreements through which the WIB may service their respective areas. Each 
local WIB has a master contract with the sponsoring local government entity 
(OECD, 2014c, p. 23).
55Welfare to work devolution in Canada, the USA, Germany and the netherlands
The WIBs commission and oversee the work of some 3,000 one-stop 
centres (now known as American Job Centers). One-stops provide general 
labour market information and matching services through self service 
and online channels, with more expensive WIA programmes restricted to 
eligible disadvantaged groups. Another federal programme provides separate 
funding for state Employment Services which also deliver job-matching 
services and some employment-assistance programmes to job seekers and 
employers. In combination these programmes serve more than 27 million 
individuals, with expenditures of nearly US$3.5 billion annually (OECD, 
2014c, p. 20).
WIA programmes for eligible adults and redundant workers provide for 
three levels of service: core, intensive and training. Core services include 
basic job search assistance; intensive services include activities such as 
comprehensive assessments and case management. Skills training is provided 
through individual accounts that participants can use to access courses 
delivered by providers registered with the WIB. The ‘work first’ character of 
the WIA system is reinforced by the requirement that participants can access 
more expensive skills provision only after engaging with job search and 
counselling services (Bradley, 2013). Youth services have a greater emphasis 
on education and training outcomes. WIBs cannot normally provide 
direct services to participants so one-stops and core services are typically 
provided through a network of contracted public, non-profit and private 
organisations.
In addition to core services, WIA required states and WIBs to co-ordinate 
16 federally funded employment and training services into a single delivery 
system. WIA allows flexibility in the way that mandatory programme partners 
provide services through the one-stop system, either on site or through 
referrals. The participation of state Employment Services varies, and in a 
significant number of states they operate through a separate office network. 
States can voluntarily co-locate other services in one-stops, such as those 
for welfare recipients receiving TANF.
Only organisations delivering WIA funded services have a contract 
with the WIB. Relationships with one-stop partnering organisations are 
organised through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This agreement 
establishes joint processes and procedures designed to enable partners to 
co-ordinate or integrate resources and service delivery. By entering the 
MoU, the parties agree to abide by the terms, conditions, goals, policies and 
principles established through WIA. The partners cover a share of the service 
costs proportionate to the use of the system attributable to the partner’s 
programme (OECD, 2014c, p. 25). WIBs can also act as catalysts at times of 
crisis, bringing together a wider range of local organisations concerned with 
workforce development issues.
States submit and agree five-year workforce development plans 
with the DoL. State plans will typically assess the skills and economic 
development needs of the area, set targets and outline the strategy and 
programmes for meeting identified objectives. The WIA provided for greater 
accountability by establishing new performance measures to gauge the 
results of the programmes with the low-cost use of quarterly UI wage 
data to monitor outcome performance.40 Key performance measures for 
adults and ‘dislocated workers’ include entry into unsubsidised employment, 
retention and earnings after six months, and states also are required to test 
satisfaction ratings by both individuals seeking employment and employers 
looking for qualified workers. 
‘State adjusted levels of performance’ are negotiated for each of the core 
WIA indicators, reflecting historical data, economic conditions and services 
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provided. State plans must show progress towards ‘continuous improvement’ 
and be designed to ensure high levels of user and employer satisfaction, 
with performance benchmarked against the performance of comparable 
states. When agreed, the goals are incorporated into the plan. States have 
some discretion to decide which eligibility groups should be given priority 
and can add their own performance standards (Bradley, 2013). At the local 
level, WIBs produce a local plan and procure WIA-funded services. Local 
plans must include a description of the activities the WIB will pursue, the 
MoU established between the WIB and each of its one-stop partners, and 
performance targets negotiated between the local board and the state 
governor (OECD, 2014c, p. 26). 
A state that fails to meet its agreed level of performance for one year is 
given remedial support and technical assistance. After two years of failure, it 
may be subject to a 5% reduction in its annual WIA grant. If a state meets or 
exceeds its performance targets, it is eligible for ‘high performance grants’ 
(Wander and Wiseman, 2009). Similar conditions and performance standards 
apply to WIB contracts with public and private providers. 
The federal government provides grants to states to operate WIA 
programmes. About 85% of federal WIA funds are passed from the state 
to local WIBs. The remaining 15% ‘set-aside’ of WIA funds are used by 
state governors for activities such as state-wide evaluations of workforce 
programmes and incentive grants for local areas. This allows state governors 
to fund an array of activities, including innovative training programmes 
for employed workers, research and demonstration projects, and capacity 
building and technical assistance. Innovation and adaptation has been 
facilitated by the extensive use of waivers from WIA rules which are 
negotiated with the federal DoL. Waivers were particularly important during 
the recession and have also enabled some WIBs to directly deliver services, 
transfer funds between different budget lines, target particular under-served 
groups, and provide customised on-the-job training for some employers 
(OECD, 2014c, p.27). 
There are some variations in how WIA grants are calculated for young 
people, ‘dislocated’ and ‘disadvantaged’ workers, but the criteria include 
levels of unemployment and disadvantage measured through official poverty 
rates. A detailed assessment of the WIA funding formula and the earlier 
system it replaced found that, over time, state allocations had changed 
markedly in response to changing unemployment levels. States were 
protected, however, from abrupt reductions in their allocations through a 
transitional and minimum provision process (Jacobson, et al., 2002). 
Welfare reform and devolution in the USA
WIA implementation occurred alongside welfare reform and the devolution 
of support for poor families. In 1996, the previous ‘safety-net’ entitlement 
cash assistance programme was replaced by the time-limited TANF. States 
had always had the freedom to set benefit levels but the new system also 
gave them flexibility to determine eligibility rules, work incentives, work 
requirements, sanctions, time limits and service design. TANF replaced earlier 
match-funding arrangements with a block grant, frozen on the cash basis of 
federal and state spending in 1994.
The 1996 TANF legislation, and its subsequent re-authorisation, 
established limited federal rules and priorities, which are enforced through 
a national performance framework. HHS utilises a range of measures to 
monitor and assess state performance but there is particular emphasis on 
the work participation rate; the legislation requires states to enrol 50% of  
all families and 90% of two-parent families in work or work-related activities 
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for specified hours per week. HHS also assesses state progress on moving  
TANF recipients into work through outcome measures on job entry, job 
retention and earnings gain, and monitors any increase in the number of 
children living in married, two-parent families. Although the federal TANF 
allocation is no longer designed to respond to fluctuations in caseloads, 
the legislation replaced the earlier match-funding requirement with a 
maintenance of effort obligation. This requires that each state maintain at 
least 80% of its 1994 spending on the welfare benefit TANF replaced and if 
it fails to do so, it faces fiscal penalties (in some cases the requirement can be 
reduced to 75%). 
The federal agency has a number of other incentives and penalties to 
steer state performance. Incentives include a High Performance Bonus 
system, under which states may be paid up to a maximum of 5% of their 
annual federal TANF award. Penalties apply only, however, to work 
participation rates which give these standards a higher priority. Where 
participation rates are unmet, HHS will send a penalty notice to the state 
concerned. The state then has the opportunity to avoid a penalty by 
providing reasonable cause or submitting a compliance plan indicating how it 
will ensure that parents receiving cash benefits will meet the required work 
participation requirements.
The impacts of welfare to work devolution in the USA
US welfare reform attracted much interest in the UK, and in other OECD 
countries, because it was associated with a rapid reduction in the number 
of families receiving cash welfare payments, which fell from a peak of 
5.1 million in 1994 to less than 2 million in 2000. Reform coincided with 
employment growth and the expansion of in-work tax credits and other 
work supports. Analysts such as Danielson and Klerman (2004) suggest that 
about 20% of the decline in caseloads could be attributed to time limits and 
benefit sanctions, about 25% to the economy and about 30% to a ‘residual 
policy bundle’, including tax credits, with the remaining impact unexplained. 
TANF had been introduced amid concern that the greater flexibility given 
to states might induce a ‘race to the bottom’ in which states with more 
generous welfare benefits or policies might reduce them to avoid migration 
of poor populations from neighbouring states (Bruekner, 2000; Schram 
and Beer, 1999). The evidence suggests that any welfare migration effect 
was negligible, and although there was evidence that states strategically set 
their welfare policies in relation to those of their neighbours, there was no 
simple downward convergence. There was instead ‘substantial heterogeneity’ 
in state policy choices and evidence of much policy innovation, especially 
between 1996 and 1998, with many states shifting the distribution of cash 
benefits away from people without income towards those with at least some 
earnings  (Weaver and Gais, 2002). Researchers pointed out that in the 
first decade of implementation, the design of TANF maintenance of effort 
requirements and a strong economy may have reduced downward pressures, 
whereas later analysis finds that welfare competition among neighbouring 
states may have been a ‘factor behind downward trends in welfare 
generosity’ (Burns, 2012, p. 22).
While many studies consider the variable impacts of US welfare reform 
between different states, there are few studies that assess decentralisation 
within states. An exception is the analysis undertaken by Kim and Fording 
(2010), in which they study the effects of what they describe as ‘second-
order’ devolution in those states where significant elements of ‘policy 
authority’ were devolved to county or city governments or to WIBs. In 
this analysis, the researchers test competing claims made by advocates 
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and opponents of decentralisation. Advocates of decentralisation suggest 
that because local government and boards know the needs of their poor 
residents better than central government they would implement TANF more 
effectively. The opposing contention is that decentralisation within states 
might also lead to a ‘race to the bottom’, with second-order administrations 
likely to implement more restrictive and punitive measures. 
The researchers identified 14 states, including New York, California 
and Florida, where there had been significant second-order devolution, 
including fixed block grants, to either county or city governments (8) or 
to WIBs (6). They then tested decentralisation effects by measuring TANF 
caseload declines, the use of sanctions, and several work-related outcomes 
among recipients between 1980 and 2003. After controlling results for 
variables, such as unemployment rates and ‘government ideology’, the 
analysis showed support for both contentions on decentralisation. They 
found that states with second-order devolution experienced greater falls in 
caseloads; were more likely to use punitive policy tools, such as sanctions; 
and had higher rates of exits to employment and earnings gains among their 
TANF recipients. The analysis did not allow the researchers to identify causal 
mechanisms at work but the authors suggest that the use of block grants 
within decentralised states gave local government or WIBs strong incentives 
to reduce caseloads (as they otherwise had to pay any costs above the block 
grant from their own resources). They also surmise that policy-makers in 
decentralised settings may have been able to mobilise local resources, modify 
programme requirements and better target services at local claimants and 
employers. A separate study of welfare devolution to local government 
within North Carolina found that counties which were given more flexibility 
spent ‘dramatically less’ than others which was partly attributable to the state 
failing, over many years, to penalise local government for not meeting their 
maintenance of effort obligations (Berner, 2005).
There are contending views on how well the devolved US welfare system 
responded to the rapid increase in unemployment and hardship associated 
with the Great Recession of 2007–09. Pavetti, et al. (2013) found that 
TANF was a less effective ‘safety net’ than the entitlement cash benefit it 
replaced and coverage increased ‘only modestly’ during the recession. It 
actually fell in some states where, in response to budget pressures, benefit 
levels were reduced, time limits shortened or other cutbacks introduced. 
Haskins, et al. (2014) come to different conclusions. They cite data showing 
that the increase in TANF coverage during the 2007–09 recession was 
greater than that which occurred in the earlier 1990 recession when the 
earlier entitlement cash benefit was in operation. They conclude that the 
‘system of balancing work requirements and welfare benefits worked fairly 
well’, with poor families finding other jobs and/or supporting themselves 
through the wider US safety net system, including unemployment 
benefits, tax credits and food stamps (Haskins, et al., 2014, p. 6). Another 
analysis concluded that the decline in welfare caseloads had now ‘become 
permanent’ but the feared race to the bottom had not materialised because 
of maintenance of effort requirements and the development of other state 
and federal work-based income support programmes, especially tax credits 
(Sutter, 2013).
The integration of US welfare and workforce development systems
One of the factors associated with the relative success of decentralised 
welfare to work delivery concerns the capacity of implementing authorities 
to coordinate and/or integrate WIA, TANF and related services. The extent 
of such cooperation has varied, with studies reporting that categorical 
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federal funding streams and programme goals that create different eligibility 
rules, programme definitions, reporting requirements, performance 
measures, and service priorities, hampered the coordination or integration 
of front-line services (Barnow, 2009). Nevertheless, many states made full 
use of the flexibilities available, including acquiring additional waivers from 
federal requirements. 
Studies have found varied patterns of such coordination and integration 
at state and local levels. Several decentralised states, such as Florida and 
Texas, merged their welfare and workforce development programmes. 
Other states made use of a variety of contracts, financial agreements, 
MoUs and other service-level agreements to coordinate activities between 
state welfare and workforce development agencies. Such coordination 
typically included co-location of or electronic linkages between welfare and 
workforce development services in one-stops (as in much of Wisconsin); 
blending of separate funding streams; and the development of more 
seamless service delivery through staff training across different one-stop 
services; common application processes, integrated intake; shared computer 
systems and shared action plans for service users (Blank, 2009; Noyes and 
Corbett, 2005; Ranghelli, et al., 2003). 
There has been much criticism of continuing fragmentation, overlap, and 
duplication within US employment and training programmes, culminating in 
new legislation replacing WIA from July 2015. Provisions in the Workforce 
Investment and Opportunity Act (WIOA) (2014) should help resolve 
some service delivery, coordination and integration issues. The legislation 
modifies the structure of WIBs, allowing them to be smaller (19 members) 
and empowering them with more responsibility to be strategic actors in 
developing labour market capacity and allowing them a greater role in 
fostering partnerships between workforce development, education and 
economic development. The Act, for example, now includes TANF as a 
mandatory one-stop partner, and state Employment Services will be  
required to deliver their services within one-stops rather than through 
separate offices. If local areas fail to reach an agreement on shared costs 
to fund the one-stop infrastructure, a state funding protocol for allocating 
costs will be imposed.
The legislation integrates a number of separate federal skills and 
employment programmes and also standardises performance accountability 
with the creation of six common core measures for adult programmes 
and a related set of measures for young people. This will allow for greater 
coordination and assessment of relative performance. Adult measures will 
include entry into unsubsidised employment; median earnings after six 
months; measurable skills gains toward a credential or employment; and 
employer engagement. A more rigorous comparative methodology will be 
used to adjust state performance expectations taking into account local 
economic conditions and participant characteristics. States will continue to 
be able to set their own supplementary performance indicators.
The ‘work first’ mandatory sequencing of adult services will be eliminated, 
and core and intensive activities will be combined into a ‘career services’ 
category in which workforce staff will have the flexibility to better meet  
the individual needs of job seekers. The legislation will allow some 
expenditure on employed workers and contains provision also for greater 
future emphasis on progression. In particular, it encourages WIBs to 
further develop sector based ‘career pathways’ and, among other things, 
authorises funding for a multi-state study to develop and implement career 
advancement models for low-wage health care providers and providers of 
early education and childcare.41
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The OECD concludes that the WIOA reforms build on and update 
existing state-local partnerships, further developing a better co-ordinated 
system ‘that is decentralised, flexible, locally focused, and with an emphasis 
on inclusion’ (2014c, p. 21).
Welfare to work devolution in the netherlands
There have been extensive reforms to the Dutch social insurance and 
means-tested social assistance systems since the late 1980s. Activation 
reforms targeted at the unemployed and those claiming social assistance 
have been designed to prioritise ‘work before benefits’. There has been 
major institutional change, involving the national social insurance agency 
(UWV) and devolution of budgets to municipalities. 
In 2009, the UWV was made responsible for front-line employment 
services and its performance is assessed in relation to benefit off-flows and 
satisfaction levels among job seekers and employers. UWV districts and 
local branches have some flexibility in how they spend centrally allocated 
funds and purchase services from private providers. UWV ‘work coaches’ 
are responsible for giving employment support to the insured unemployed 
and those receiving disability benefits. There have been significant austerity-
driven reductions in UWV budgets since 2012, leading to major change in 
service delivery and the termination of most contracted-out employment 
services (Froy, et al., 2011). Front-line employment services and benefit 
administration now are largely delivered online with face-to-face services 
restricted to those without digital skills or most likely to become long-term 
unemployed.42 
The municipalities, of which there are over 450, deliver social assistance 
through ‘work and income’ sections in their Social Services Departments. 
Case managers carry out assessments and channel eligible participants 
into employment assistance. Until 2001, central government reimbursed 
90% of municipal social assistance expenditure and, at this point, activation 
programmes were targeted at centrally determined priority groups. In 2001, 
the proportion of social assistance funding reimbursed by the centre was 
reduced to 75% in order to increase the incentive for municipalities to place 
people in employment. This incentive was sharpened further in 2004 with 
the introduction of block grant funding by the Work and Income Act (2003). 
The legislation requires municipalities to provide social assistance to poor 
people but gives them great freedom in service design and delivery. It also 
stipulates that employable claimants are under an obligation to co-operate 
with reintegration services and to seek ‘generally acceptable’ rather than the 
previous ‘suitable’ employment.
Legislation requires the UWV and municipalities to cooperate in 
promoting the reintegration of service users and, over time, both institutions 
have been subject to requirements to purchase more intensive services from 
private providers (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). The organisations were also 
required to co-locate and co-ordinate service delivery for claimants and 
employers in a national network of one-stop Work Squares, of which there 
were 127 in 2010. These integrated offices are co-managed by the local 
UWV and Social Services Directors, who enter into operating agreements. 
Local joint targets are agreed and cascaded to work coaches and case 
managers, who are expected to meet certain requirements. In 2010 some of 
the offices had integrated teams but co-ordination of service delivery was 
hampered by the different accountability and funding rules of the agencies 
involved (Froy, et al., 2011). Following austerity cuts that commenced in 
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2012, the number of Work Squares was reduced to the 30 located in the 
largest municipalities.
The Work and Income Fund and municipal ‘work first’ strategies
The municipal Work and Income Fund has two components. The Income 
Fund pays for means-tested assistance and is determined on the basis of 
economic and social indicators (see Box 1). A separate flexible Work Fund 
is designed to pay for reintegration services and can be used only to pay 
for such services. Any surplus in the Work Fund is returned to central 
government. In contrast, if the municipality pays less than it is allocated in 
the Income Fund, it can use the surplus as it sees fit. The risk is that if it 
overspends on benefits, it has to subsidise these payments from its own 
resources. The municipality thus has a powerful incentive to reduce the 
number of people claiming social assistance but must do so in the context 
of national eligibility rules and welfare benefit levels that are uniform 
throughout the country. Municipal strategies have focused primarily on more 
rigorous testing of eligibility, fraud reduction strategies and the introduction 
of ‘work first’ and workfare activation programmes (analogous to the welfare 
to work programmes implemented by US states). 
Box 1: The netherlands block grant for welfare payments
In the Netherlands, the national budget available for welfare block 
grants is calculated annually on the basis of independent forecasts 
of eligible individuals. Forecasts are based on the number of existing 
welfare beneficiaries, unemployment trends, and legislative changes that 
might affect caseload volumes. The macro budget is allocated between 
municipalities according to a regression formula which reflects the size 
of municipality and demographic and labour market characteristics, 
with some variation for smaller municipalities (for which reliable data is 
not available, so previous expenditure level is also used). The formula is 
updated annually. As the allocation is not legally designed to reimburse 
actual social assistance expenditure, municipalities are free to retain 
any surplus, but strict rules ensure they meet over-spending from their 
own resources and they can return to central government for additional 
funding only in exceptional circumstances. Analysts suggest that despite 
some problems, the Dutch funding formula, when combined with a 
strong cultural commitment to equal access, has ensured that the 
system has reaped ‘the benefits of decentralisation while at the same 
time ensuring a high degree of similarity in service standards across the 
country’ (Allers, 2011, p. 8).
Despite local variation, a common feature of ‘work first’ strategies is the 
requirement that employable social assistance recipients engage with work-
related activities before or immediately after they claim benefit. Failure 
to comply results in sanctions or benefit withdrawal. These interventions 
are often supplemented by mandatory work experience or workfare for 
those harder to place in jobs. According to municipalities, these mandatory 
programmes serve two different goals. They minimise demands on social 
assistance through deterrence and maximise the outflow into work through 
employment assistance. The cumulative impact of legislative and service 
delivery reforms has been a significant ‘cultural change’ in local government, 
with staff now working ‘in a more result-oriented manner’ and more focused 
on preventing fraud and on assisting applicants to enter employment. 
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The impact of welfare to work devolution in the Netherlands
Evaluations report that the early impact of the changes to social assistance 
in the Netherlands were sharpest at the entry point to the system, with more 
intensive ‘gatekeeping’ combined with a strong emphasis on ensuring that 
young people engage in education, training and work experience, rather than 
enter the benefit system (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006). By contrast, there was 
less provision made for the harder-to-place groups that previously had to 
be serviced under the earlier centrally defined priority targets (van Berkel, 
2006). Subsequent evaluations report that, following the initial focus on 
‘quick wins’, there was evidence of better municipal performance in targeting 
services at the harder-to-place groups (Blommesteijn, et al., 2012).
There is flexibility in the Dutch system, and in the exceptional 
circumstances following the recent recession, the national government 
introduced short-term increases in social assistance funding, including 
regional performance agreements with the 30 largest Dutch municipalities 
to combat youth unemployment. Expenditure was subsequently reduced 
and further austerity cuts implemented. At the same time, further welfare 
to work devolution is planned. The Work Capacity Act (2013) devolves 
responsibility to municipalities from 2015 for benefits and reintegration 
services for other groups, in particular for the increased number of young 
people now claiming centrally financed disability benefits (an increase some 
partially attribute to the effect of the earlier devolution reforms). 
Municipal devolution in the Netherlands has illustrated some strengths… 
and weaknesses of local control. It has enhanced local ownership and 
political accountability for the system and enabled the municipalities to 
adapt reintegration services to diverse local populations and circumstances. 
Municipalities have experienced a sharp learning curve in how to activate 
recipients and procure from and work with private providers, and some have 
struggled to manage these new delivery arrangements. Despite national 
entitlements, local diversity has also resulted in some erosion of shared 
national equity, leading to the emergence of variations between different 
local welfare regimes (Blommesteijn, et al., 2012; van Berkel, 2006).
Welfare to work devolution in Germany
In Germany, responsibility for employment and welfare to work policies is 
shared between federal, state and local governments. Federal government 
sets national targets and budgets which are negotiated, implemented 
and co-financed with state governments, municipalities and the public 
employment service. 
The national Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA; referred to here as the PES) 
is a quasi-independent agency, including strong representation of employer 
and trade union organisations, which operates under the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs. The PES is the central body 
responsible for labour market intelligence, the unemployment insurance 
system, and the delivery of employment assistance and labour market 
programmes. Prior to reform, local government was solely responsible for 
safety-net social assistance for the uninsured unemployed and for most 
related welfare to work services and programmes.
The national PES is composed of 10 regions with 178 district and 666 
branch offices. The agency exercises considerable discretion, within the 
budgetary and legal framework established by social security law (Mosley, 
2012). The agency enjoys significant policy autonomy derived from its 
institutional setting and its responsibility to levy, manage and administer 
63
insurance funds. It has developed a strong performance management regime 
but target setting incorporates elements of dialogue, with some targets 
set autonomously at the regional level, and national ‘framework targets’ 
reported to be only one element in a more consultative style of performance 
assessment (Weishaupt, 2011; Nunn, 2012). The performance of each 
district is monitored monthly and Jobcentre performance benchmarked 
across comparable labour markets. Tripartite committees monitor local 
PES management and provide insight into the needs of local employers 
and employees. In contrast with the British JCP ‘off benefit’ measure PES 
performance is judged on actual job entry sustained for a minimum of seven 
days (Nunn, 2012, p. 45).43
The Hartz reforms and basic income for jobseekers
The national PES has undergone a major transformation alongside and 
as part of the so-called Hartz reforms implemented between 2002 and 
2005. The PES reforms strengthened centralisation and the rolling out 
of a new national service delivery model which was influenced by the 
preceding British reforms to JCP (Finn, et al., 2005). Among other changes, 
the reform required local PES districts to contract with external providers 
through regional purchasing offices, which have made more rigorous use of 
competitive tendering and price competition. This change was perceived to 
have limited the capacity of local managers to tailor programmes to meet 
local needs although it may have increased efficiency by introducing more 
competition than existed under earlier arrangements (Mosley, 2010).
In 2005, the final Hartz reform created a new framework for the 
integrated provision of benefits and labour market services to the long-
term unemployed and other employable social assistance recipients. 
Previously, the unemployment insurance fund had provided a wage-related 
unemployment benefit for the short-term unemployed, with a gradually 
reducing amount of federally financed unemployment assistance for those 
who were long-term unemployed. Municipalities provided separately funded 
social assistance for the poor and, over time, found their budgets under 
pressure as caseloads increased and because they were ‘topping up’ the 
insurance-related allowance payments of a growing number of long-term 
unemployed people. 
The German benefit system is now comprised of unemployment insurance 
benefit, which normally lasts for up to a year for those who qualify, and a 
safety-net means-tested benefit – basic income support for jobseekers. 
Basic income support is now solely funded by the federal government 
and administered jointly by the PES and local authorities. Although it is a 
household benefit, all adult recipients of basic income support who are able to 
work for three or more hours a day or for 15 hours a week must be available 
for and seeking work. Each active claimant is allocated an individual counsellor 
and must agree an individual reintegration plan.44
Joint PES and municipal Jobcentres
Local joint agencies deliver one-stop services through Jobcentres in 
most parts of Germany. The agencies are responsible for administering 
basic income support and work-related requirements and for delivering 
employment support and assistance, including access to services provided 
by local government. Political conflict between the social democratic 
government and opposition parties between 2002 and 2004 resulted 
in a compromise on the respective roles of the PES and municipalities. 
This meant that initially 69, and subsequently 110, opt-out municipalities 
assumed full devolved responsibility for basic income support claimants. 
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Related developments concerned the passage of a constitutional 
amendment to clarify the legal status of joint agencies and a reassertion 
of the role of regional state governments in relation to the opt-out 
municipalities.  This means that national targets and budgets for the opt-out 
municipalities are negotiated between the federal and state government, 
with the state government then negotiating directly with local government.
The joint Jobcentres are established on the basis of a formal agreement 
between the local authority and the local PES. The appointment and powers 
of the chief executive of the joint agency are regulated by the agreement 
between the contracting parties. There are some mandatory requirements, 
such as providing an appeals procedure, but there is considerable discretion 
on the organisation of work processes. The local authority, for example, 
can carry out its responsibilities directly or delegate them to third parties. 
Each partner normally bears the costs of the services it provides in the joint 
centres (Mosley, 2005). 
In joint agencies the PES is responsible for administering basic income 
support and for financing and implementing active measures and the 
municipal social welfare department is responsible for the administration and 
financing of rent and heating subsidies and complementary social services 
(e.g. debt advice, drug and psychological counselling and childcare provision). 
The transition to basic income support meant that the responsibility of 
municipalities to finance basic income support was reduced, but their 
continued responsibility for financing rent and heating allowances is 
designed to give them a continuing incentive to support the implementation 
of reintegration measures (Mosley, 2005). It is estimated that the budget 
for rent and heating allowances is almost as high as that for basic income 
support and local authorities have to pay 70% of the total with only 30% 
provided by the federal government. By contrast the federal share of core 
basic income-related spending is now about 70% (which has fallen marginally 
from an estimated 74% in 2006).
Federal resources for employment services and labour market 
programmes can be used flexibly and the national budget is allocated on 
the basis of a formula based on the number of claimants in the previous 
period. Local joint agencies are also allowed to transfer funds between 
their programme and administrative budgets. Federal basic income support 
payments are, however, a separate entitlement with no cap on the budget, 
which is responsive to local demand from eligible claimants. There was 
originally no performance variable in relation to the basic income support 
budget but there is now a performance indicator which is used to measure 
and encourage reductions in welfare caseloads. 
The joint Jobcentres have their own management and governing board, 
in which the PES and municipal partners are equally represented. The formal 
agreement obliges both sides to engage in an ongoing process of co-
ordination and negotiation of their business strategy. Mosley suggests that 
while this relationship is more than simple co-location, it is ‘an incomplete 
organisation with serious structural difficulties’. It is highly dependent on 
good working relationships between the PES and municipalities, but the 
‘strong influence of the PES with its centralistic organisational culture 
greatly complicates decision-making in the Jobcenters’ (Mosley, 2010, p. 5). 
Performance management in the joint Jobcentres is embedded in the 
federal PES system of national targets and service standards, and monitored 
through their integrated IT system. Centrally disaggregated local targets 
must, however, be approved by the joint Jobcentres governing body. The 
local PES director has the responsibility of winning approval and of mediating 
any conflicts. Crucially, the special status of the joint Jobcentres gives ‘the 
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local PES management itself more leverage to assert local discretion in 
dealing with the PES hierarchy’ (Mosley, 2010, p. 9). Nevertheless, there 
has been friction between the national PES and joint Jobcentres, with the 
centre reported to be restricting the capacity of local agencies to adapt 
national employment programmes to the particular needs of basic income 
claimants. This centralising tendency has been reinforced by the approach of 
parliamentary scrutiny bodies and the German audit office; they are critical 
of the loss of transparency and oversight involved in moving away from clear 
national rules and standardised programmes and practices.
The national PES has helped shape the model adopted in most joint 
Jobcentres, where service delivery ‘strongly resembles’ that provided in PES 
offices for the insured unemployed. Key features include the separation of 
benefit administration and employment assistance and the differentiation of 
client services according to their assessed distance from the labour market. 
More employable jobseekers are assigned to placement counsellors, while 
young people or adults with greater barriers are assigned to specialised 
case managers. In contrast with opt-out municipalities, joint Jobcentres 
are characterised by higher uniformity and standardisation across different 
regions, and by the more frequent use of sanctions (ZEW, 2008). Some 
problems are reported to arise because there is no single local chain of 
command and only limited integration of PES and municipal IT systems 
and client data. It has taken significant effort to develop a common service 
culture, with tensions reported between the different approaches of PES 
counsellors and those of qualified social workers. 
The opt-out municipalities
The 110 opt-out municipalities negotiate their local goals and operational 
targets with state government which agrees targets and budgets with 
the federal government. In these areas the municipality is responsible for 
providing benefits and services for basic income support recipients. These 
municipalities developed service delivery models separately and without 
access to the national PES IT infrastructure and support function available 
to the joint Jobcentres. Municipal advisory boards, with representation from 
the social partners and other welfare agencies, oversee local delivery.
Although they are subject to national financial and audit controls 
there is greater variation in service delivery in the opt-out municipalities, 
where there is less standardisation and more focus on personalisation. The 
municipalities also largely separate benefit administration and advisory 
services, with ‘only very few’ opting for integrated case management 
(Mosley, 2010). Opt-out municipalities are reported to make little use of 
competitive contracting when purchasing employment and training services 
whereas joint Jobcentres are required to use regional PES procurement 
centres. 
Despite these organisational differences, it appears that in practice, 
similar goals are pursued under both models, with the municipalities 
giving somewhat less weight to rapid job placement and slightly more to 
maintaining or improving employability (Mosley, 2010, p. 10). There is 
evidence of ‘organisational learning’, with the performance of opt-out 
municipalities improving over time (Hörning, 2011).
The impact of welfare to work devolution in Germany
Evaluations of the Hartz reforms report mixed impacts from the different 
measures introduced, but that after the implementation phase, the  
package of reforms was found to have contributed to increased  
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employment and reductions in unemployment (Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; 
Eichhorst, et al., 2008). 
In terms of the local delivery of employment-related services, reviews of 
evidence of local variations reported that integration into unsubsidised jobs 
was faster and up to 25% higher in the localities with joint Jobcentres that 
had implemented more employment-focused service delivery strategies, 
backed up by sanctions (Konle-Seidl, 2009; Hörning, 2011). Another study 
reported that job placement by joint agencies was more cost effective and 
3.8% higher than in the municipal models (ZEW, 2008). The study found 
also that the intensity of contact with the client and close relations with a 
counsellor positively improved labour market integration, and that results 
were better in integrated services where one counsellor was responsible for 
both employment assistance and job placement (although this model was not 
used extensively). 
Both German models represent forms of political devolution in which 
the governance of implementation has been devolved to lower tiers of 
government, either partially in the joint Jobcentres or completely in the 
opt-out municipalities. Although the joint Jobcentres had less flexibility 
than might have been expected, their subjection to stronger national 
performance management and other aspects of PES accountability reduced 
central risk. There has been some debate on whether reform had the effect 
of devolving local delivery or centralising control of municipal activation 
policy, reducing local government to the provision of supplementary social 
services (Mosley, 2005).
Conclusion 
In each of the case-study countries, policy authority over welfare to work 
systems has been at least partly devolved to local actors. Welfare reform has 
been associated with changes in the financing of social assistance benefits 
and responsibilities for employment and skills programmes. In three of the 
countries, lower tiers of government have been given greater freedom to 
design and organise benefits and welfare to work service delivery, which 
central governments finance through block grants. In the case of Germany, 
devolution has involved the creation of new local partnerships between the 
PES and municipalities, underpinned by a centralisation of responsibility for 
basic income support.
The introduction of block grants has been a significant driver of change. 
The new funding system allowed for local policy innovation and exposed 
lower tiers of government to the full costs of their eligibility decisions. 
The increased responsibility for financing welfare benefits increased the 
incentive to keep benefit caseloads and unemployment low. In the case of 
Canada, the USA and the Netherlands, caseloads fell for several years after 
the introduction of block grants, with new financial and legislative incentives 
facilitating the introduction and implementation of welfare to work measures 
(Grubb, 2009). There remain contending views on the poverty impact of 
these changes, with increased employment rates offset by increased in-work 
poverty and the ‘disconnection’ of some highly disadvantaged people from 
the system.
In each country, the delivery of employment and training services is 
now typically organised through a mixed economy of public and private 
organisations. The implementation process is shaped by a greater focus on 
performance measurement and on accountability for securing employment 
outcomes, often reinforced through incentives and penalties for public 
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agencies and contracted providers. Work-related benefit requirements and 
intake processes have become more rigorous for employable claimants. 
Reductions in out-of-work benefit generosity have been partly balanced by 
more generous in-work supports. In each of the countries there has been 
an increase in the number of poor people combining welfare and work and 
increased concern about how to promote progression in employment.
The findings from the case studies highlight the impacts associated with 
welfare to work devolution and the challenges and risks that policy-makers 
have to manage well if they are to secure the gains associated with greater 
local control, flexibility and integration of welfare to work services (OECD, 
2013; Mosley, 2011; Atkinson, 2010). These challenges concern how to 
manage risks to accountability, performance, service quality and equity, and 
lessons can be drawn from the case-study findings on how policy-makers in 
the four comparator countries have sought to resolve them. These lessons 
are of direct relevance to how welfare to work devolution might be taken 
forward in England and their implications are considered in more detail in the 
final part of this report.
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5 COnClUSiOn
International organisations such as the OECD 
(2014a) assess the British welfare to work system 
for jobseekers as highly effective in reducing 
benefit caseloads and in promoting high levels of 
employment. Despite success, there are significant 
weaknesses in this ‘work first regime’. 
The system performs less well in disadvantaged areas and for the most 
disadvantaged groups, and it remains poorly integrated with skills and 
other wraparound services and with economic development activity. The 
need for improved co-ordination between Jobcentres, prime providers 
and complementary local services has been intensified by welfare reform, 
expenditure cuts and by changing welfare to work caseloads. In addition 
to the regular unemployed, Jobcentres and prime providers are now also 
expected to apply differentiated conditionality regimes to harder-to-place 
jobseekers, spouses/partners, claimants of disability benefits and, in future, 
to an estimated one million low-paid workers. At the same time, large 
numbers of young people and an increased proportion of the 900,000 
long-term unemployed do not claim benefits and are disconnected from the 
employment, training and benefit systems (LGA-CESI, 2014, p. 18).
Welfare to work devolution is not a panacea for inadequate resources 
but there is evidence that it could improve the co-ordination, effectiveness 
and coverage of local service delivery systems. There are risks, however, 
that if poorly designed it could undermine the standard and effectiveness of 
national services while reducing transparency and central accountability.
The approach of the Coalition Government to welfare to work devolution 
has been in flux, with the DWP in particular adopting a more centralised 
approach than have other national departments. Growth Deals, City Deals 
and Community Budgets represent innovations in how LEPs and local 
authorities are being empowered to analyse their areas, identify priorities 
and develop approaches with the potential to better co-ordinate fragmented 
employment and skills services. In practice, however, such negotiated deals 
represent a comparatively weak type of devolution (Marlow, 2013). Local 
stakeholders have to ‘prove’ each of their propositions in a series of bilateral 
negotiations with individual departments and agencies in a process tightly 
controlled by central government. Civil servants are concerned to reduce 
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risk rather than respond ‘to cities’ ambition and capacity to take on greater 
responsibility’ (City Growth Commission, 2014, p. 52).
Caution about welfare to work devolution appears particularly strong 
within the DWP. Ministers and Whitehall civil servants have encouraged 
administrative flexibility where it helps achieve departmental objectives 
but they appear reluctant to vary much of their control of the mainstream 
welfare to work delivery system. Flexible working largely concerns provision 
for groups not covered or well-served by mainstream programmes, with 
more extensive flexibility extended only to prime providers, delivering 
centrally commissioned programmes, that are themselves weakly connected 
to local government and LEPs.
The wariness of the DWP is shared by many in central government who 
are concerned about the risks involved in decentralisation. There remains 
a strong commitment to ensure that national ‘work first’ priorities and 
the pace of welfare reform should not be undermined by divergent local 
interests and/or capabilities and this has constrained local integration and 
partnership working. There also remains considerable scepticism about the 
evidence of improved impacts that devolution advocates cite and about the 
capacity of local agencies to design employment services and commission 
them in ways that are transparent, avoid high transaction costs and improve 
employment outcomes. A further concern is that local and regional 
disparities in employment and benefit caseloads could widen further in a 
more decentralised system.
The impacts of welfare to work devolution
The quality of the impact evidence cited in the literature advocating 
greater welfare to work devolution is mixed. Many submissions from local 
government stakeholders, for example, typically assert the value of joint 
working and/or point to high self-reported job entry rates from local 
employment or skills programmes, many of which are small-scale and 
voluntary, and contrast these with headline results from mandatory large-
scale DWP programmes, especially the early results from the WP. Few of 
these local studies, however, have meaningful comparison groups, and the 
National Audit Office (NAO) has also found little ‘robust evidence’ that ‘joint 
or collaborative [partnership] working improved outcomes’ (2013a, p. 8). 
Several City and Growth Deals commit local partnerships to undertaking 
higher-quality impact evaluations but it will be some time before meaningful 
results on these programmes are available.
By contrast, there is stronger evidence from the case-study countries 
reviewed. In each country, evaluations of devolved welfare to work 
arrangements show that it has contributed to reductions in caseloads and 
increases in employment, although there are contending views on the quality 
of the outcomes secured. It remains difficult to disentangle the particular 
impacts of institutional and service delivery reforms from those of the 
welfare to work policies that agencies and organisations implemented. There 
is little specific evidence on the particular impact of devolution, but positive 
evaluations suggest that giving lower tiers of government or partnerships 
responsibility for funding of services, benefit payments and responsibility 
for programmes encouraged innovation and enabled local actors to design 
and provide more co-ordinated services better tailored to the needs of local 
communities and employers (Froy, et al., 2011; Kim and Fording, 2010; Seith, 
et al., 2007). There is evidence also that devolved responsibility for financing 
benefit payments has given lower tiers of government stronger incentives to 
keep unemployment low.
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The potential for welfare to work devolution in England 
There is a plethora of reports from local authorities, local government 
organisations, think tanks and academics outlining a diverse range of 
proposals for further welfare to work devolution in England. Such devolution 
is now viewed also as a potential contributor to effective local growth 
strategies, with associated changes in employment and skills provision 
intended, at least from the perspective of local government, to ensure 
that poorer residents benefit from the increased employment and wealth 
associated with economic development.
The basic argument from a wide range of stakeholders is that despite 
recent reforms, the current systems for commissioning and delivering 
employment and skills are not structured to deliver the ‘step change’ in 
performance needed to meet the challenges faced by many city and county 
regions (LGA-CESI, 2014). By contrast, it is argued that sub-regional local 
government can better tailor welfare to work services for the benefit of 
local residents and employers. Many of the larger local authorities now have 
experience in commissioning and managing employment services, and these 
stakeholders claim also to have the capacity to better connect welfare to 
work services with skills, health and other wraparound services which are 
often critical in addressing the underlying issues faced by disadvantaged 
claimants. 
Most of the proposals reviewed suggest that some or all DWP 
employment programmes be devolved and commissioned on the basis of 
LEP boundaries or those of combined authorities.45 This would have two 
main advantages. The increase in the number of areas and the reduction in 
the size of contracts would open up the market to a potentially larger and 
more diverse group of providers. It would also align provision with functional 
economic areas and promote connections between welfare to work services 
and local growth strategies, facilitating partnership working with local skills 
and other service providers (Lawton, et al., 2014; OECD, 2014a).
The Core Cities network has, among others, outlined an approach for the 
next parliament through which virtually all employment and skills budgets, 
including the WP, could be devolved and where each city would become a 
‘catalyst’ to improve skills and employability. They propose that cities should 
develop five-year Skills and Labour Market Agreements with their LEPs and 
other local partners, with the North East Combined Authority leading on 
developments. These agreements are loosely modelled on those developed 
in Canada and comprise a ‘single plan and investment framework’, a ‘common 
commissioning framework’ and a ‘whole system’ approach that would 
integrate delivery of local skills and employment services (Core Cities, 2013). 
Funding proposals for devolving welfare to work services vary. Most 
suggestions envisage that where local councils and partnerships become 
responsible for particular claimant groups, especially the most disadvantaged, 
they would offer higher performance and, by investing some of their own 
resources, assume greater financial risk for service delivery. In return, local 
areas would be awarded a share of the central benefit expenditure saved 
(with a 50–50 split proposed by the Key Cities, 2014). Such an approach 
requires careful design to ensure that local actors do not simply turn 
applicants away or focus mainly on new benefit applicants, as happened in 
the USA and initially in the Netherlands. Sharing benefit savings locally might, 
however, also help improve the legitimacy of performance-based contracts 
because, in contrast with existing DWP provision, a more significant 
proportion of any surplus could be reinvested in local services rather than be 
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taken as profit, and perceived to be taken out of the area, by private prime 
providers.
The major political parties are announcing more or less radical proposals 
for further devolution of economic growth powers to local authorities 
and LEPs in England after 2015. Although the Conservative46 and Liberal 
Democrat Parties have not yet made their positions clear, the Labour Party 
has committed, if elected, to devolve the WP and skills budgets to LEPs 
and city-county regions. Any such process will overlap with other changes 
in the local delivery landscape driven by the development of employment-
focused local support services, further welfare reform, and more co-working 
between local government and health services.
managing the challenges and realising the opportunities 
associated with welfare to work devolution
Various improvements may be achieved in decentralised settings but 
realising the opportunities that may be attainable relies on managing critical 
challenges.
The first issue concerns accountability. Welfare to work policies have 
national significance, and central government is accountable for setting 
priorities, providing resources and managing unemployment and welfare 
caseloads. National objectives often are the basis for negotiated agreements 
and targets with lower tiers of government and, as in the USA or Canada, 
may be monitored and managed through performance reporting systems; 
central or regional scrutiny and evaluation; and the incentives and sanctions 
embedded in conditional central funding. Such mechanisms are important 
to mitigate the potential for misaligned or conflicting incentives, especially 
the risk that in multi-tiered policy systems some levels may have strong 
incentives to shift costs and resist central reform.47
The design of funding and performance reporting mechanisms is critical 
for accountability and for shaping the priorities and behaviour of devolved 
welfare to work commissioners and providers. The development and design 
of block grants, which give local agencies flexibility and incentives to increase 
efficiency, have been strongly associated with the impacts of welfare reform. 
In contrast to Canada and the USA, the model in the Netherlands illustrates 
how devolution, local flexibility and caseload reductions may be secured 
while retaining strong national benefit entitlements. National reporting and 
performance requirements also may shape delivery in ways more likely to 
contribute to poverty reduction by, for example, focusing on the quality as 
well as the duration of the employment gained, as in the earnings and hours 
measures tracked in the US workforce development system. 
A further accountability mechanism is for the centre to facilitate 
evaluation and encourage transparency and the spread of evidence-based 
best practice, as occurred in the formative and summative evaluations 
required of provinces in Canada. This requires that LEPs and local authorities 
define clear objectives for employment, skills and welfare to work activities 
and measure outcomes in comparable ways, allowing for the identification 
of which approaches work and might be transferable. Such core aims could 
be used to align welfare to work programme interventions and their effects 
with anti-poverty strategies (Crisp, et al., 2014).
There is a key challenge also arising from the differential management, 
delivery and research capacity at different levels of government (Atkinson, 
2010). Advocates of devolution argue that local actors and decision-makers 
are more informed and knowledgeable about local circumstances and needs, 
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whereas critics argue that such knowledge gives only partial insight and 
is insufficient for analysing needs and developing appropriate strategies. 
Designing devolution has to take into account the personnel, organisational 
and fiscal capabilities of local government and LEPs. It would not be 
feasible, for example, for local areas to immediately acquire the national 
and comparative expertise that the DWP has in the design of payment, 
procurement and performance management systems, and the department 
should facilitate capacity building, evaluation and transfer of best practice. 
The differential Canadian approach to labour market agreements and the 
US use of state-based waivers allowed provincial and state governments to 
negotiate different levels of responsibility and test, evaluate and develop new 
approaches to local design and delivery before moving to fuller devolution. 
Such a differentiated and experimental approach could be an explicit national 
policy for City and Growth Deals, rather than a tacit local objective, thereby 
helping to establish a clearer pathway for further devolution of welfare to 
work policies in England.
A further issue concerns the potential for fragmentation and the 
development of more effective ways of securing local co-operation. There is 
no automatic inter-relationship between devolution in employment services 
and more coherent service delivery. The local districts or delivery units of 
national PESs, which have, as in the UK, limited management discretion for 
working with external partners, may be unable to work effectively with other 
local actors. From the perspective of local welfare to work policy, there is 
a need for flexibility in national performance and budgetary frameworks to 
foster co-operation among a range of relevant actors providing training, 
social and health services, local economic development and employment 
support.
Despite contextual differences, findings from the comparator countries 
identify some design elements that can facilitate improved welfare to work 
service delivery, including different approaches to co-ordinating and/
or co-locating services. In each of the countries, one significant factor 
concerns the development of local agreements outlining service protocols, 
working methods and respective organisational responsibilities. ‘Legacy’ IT 
systems and PES and local government data and service delivery protocols 
can facilitate (or hamper) co-ordination and ‘user journeys’. At its best, 
investment in new information systems enables service providers to co-
ordinate separate administrative data on clients, establish eligibility and 
referral mechanisms, track interventions and monitor subsequent progress. 
In the USA, for example, in some states one-stop services have consolidated 
case management and intake procedures across separately funded 
programmes through the use of shared action plans for service users and 
shared computer networks.
A final challenge concerns equity, or the risks of a ‘postcode lottery’. 
There is a potential conflict between the norm of equal treatment and 
the devolution of employment services and benefit entitlements. This has 
emerged in the UK, with the patchwork of varied support systems that 
local authorities have established in place of Council Tax Benefit and local 
emergency welfare assistance. A similar development undermined TECs in 
the 1990s when variations emerged in the services made available to the 
most disadvantaged groups. The key issue in publicly and privately delivered 
welfare to work services is the extent to which variety can be accommodated 
while ensuring acceptable service standards for disadvantaged eligible 
participants. 
Equity concerns also should be reflected in the design of the budgetary 
mechanisms through which national resources are allocated to and targeted 
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at local areas and should be commensurate with levels of unemployment 
and disadvantage, including poverty rates. The lessons from welfare to work 
devolution in the comparator countries (and from UK experience) highlight 
the importance of budgetary systems that balance performance-related 
incentives and sanctions with the necessity for maintaining investment in and 
provision of support for service users, especially in areas with weak labour 
markets. Funding formulas need to protect against abrupt changes in local 
allocations, mitigate against any ‘race to the bottom’ and provide for the 
impact of ‘economic shocks’.
Whatever the outcome of the 2015 election, the challenge for the 
next British government will be how best to structure the welfare to work 
and skills system to allow for the flexible delivery of localised strategies 
within a coherent and equitable national policy. Any move towards devolved 
welfare to work budgets must, for example, secure a fair balance between 
incentives that encourage employment outcomes and expenditure savings 
and promote poverty reduction and more inclusive economic growth. In 
the absence of constitutional guarantees, such as those in Germany’s ‘basic 
law’, devolution of welfare to work services should be underpinned also by 
transparent national minimum standards, especially where programmes 
are mandatory. This requires a transparent national regulatory regime for 
ensuring minimum standards are maintained and that local services promote 
job entry, retention and progression rather than simple caseload reduction.
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nOTES
1 The national benefit system applies throughout the United Kingdom but, in contrast with 
England, Wales and Scotland, the Northern Ireland devolved administration has greater 
flexibility over administrative arrangements and the delivery of welfare to work services.
2 See, for example, the online publications associated with the World Bank’s programme on 
‘decentralization and subnational regional economics’ at www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/
decentralization/what.htm
3 TECs were modelled on the network of local employer-led Private Industry Councils in 
the USA, which were responsible for the implementation of many federal employment and 
training programmes (Jones, 1999).
4 Michael Heseltine was Secretary of State for the Environment twice, first between 1979 and 
1983 and then between 1990 and 1992.
5 The most common lead partner was the local authority, accounting for 53% of all 
programmes, but there were also a significant number of bids led by joint partners and the 
voluntary sector.
6 Upper-tier local authorities are county councils, unitary councils, metropolitan district 
councils and London boroughs.
7 See, for example, the 1977 Fabian pamphlet on public sector reform by Liam Byrne, with 
foreword by Patricia Hewitt MP, proposing that control of BA and ES offices be handed over 
to local councils ‘which can prove they are effective’ (Byrne, 1997, p. 3).
8 The core cities network is comprised of England’s major regional cities: Birmingham, Bristol, 
Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield – see www.corecities.
com
9 The Sub-National Review recognised that some sub-regions with developed partnerships 
would want to go beyond MAAs and subsequently this led to two ‘enhanced city-regions’ 
being piloted, based around Leeds and Greater Manchester. The subsequent Local 
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act (2009) allowed for the voluntary 
creation of ‘combined authorities’ where a group of local authorities could pool appropriate 
responsibility and receive certain delegated functions from central government in order to 
deliver transport and economic policy more effectively over a wider area.
10 In 2006, the government also introduced the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI), which 
was a competitive fund targeted at supporting enterprise and business formation in deprived 
areas. The 20 LEGI programmes that operated until 2010 covered 30 local authorities and 
each was steered by some form of multi-agency partnership board with a line of reporting 
and accountability through to the LSP.
11 In Scotland and Wales, DAF continued to be administered by JCP District Managers because 
local government funding arrangements were a devolved responsibility.
12 Other examples of wraparound services include debt and money advice; childcare services; 
collaborative projects with health services; social enterprise and self-employment services; 
early intervention with ‘troubled’ families; outreach and community engagement; local labour 
clauses and local authority procurement activity; work with social landlords, and so on.
13 This is known as the DEL-AME division. Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) spending 
is planned with departments and controlled on a three-year basis in Spending Reviews. 
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) typically consists of programmes which are large, 
volatile and demand-led, and which cannot reasonably be subject to firm multi-year limits. 
The biggest element is social security and tax credit spending.
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14 The Right to Control was tested in eight areas and represented a way to give disabled people 
a legal right to control the way in which certain services are delivered to them.
15 ‘Tories plan to let benefit levels be set by local councils’, Toby Helm, The Observer,  
6 September 2009.
16 There had already been a significant decrease in the number of districts, which had fallen 
from the 144 Employment Service Districts through which the New Deals were originally 
delivered in 1998 to 48 JCP Districts in 2010.
17 During 2014, the DWP has been converting its existing offices into Digital Jobcentres, 
involving a redesign of existing space and the removal of traditional Jobpoints and ‘warm’ 
(public access) phones. The intention is for the front-line service to enable job seekers to 
use online services as the primary way of claiming benefits and seeking jobs. Jobseekers will 
be able to use their own WiFi or Web Access Devices or the personal computers available 
in the office to make benefit claims, set up their Universal Jobmatch account and search 
for employment. These changes may improve service access but they are designed also to 
increase available space to manage the increased ‘footfall’ anticipated as the department 
implements additional conditionality measures that the government has announced. These 
include, for example, weekly work-search reviews for JSA claimants and up to 13 weeks of 
daily reviews for selected WP returners.
18 Following the unsuccessful English mayoral referendums in 2012, combined authorities have 
been used as an alternative means to receive additional powers and funding as part of ‘city 
deals’ to metropolitan areas. The Greater Manchester Combined Authority was created in 
2011, with three others established in April 2014. A further combined authority is proposed 
for the West Midlands around Birmingham.
19 The Business Rates Retention Scheme was introduced in April 2013. It provides a direct link 
between business rates growth and the amount of money councils have to spend on local 
services. This is designed to provide a strong financial incentive for councils to promote 
economic growth (Sandford, 2014).
20 The design of UC involves the merger of six means-tested benefits, including tax credits, into 
a single household payment paid on a monthly basis, with the element to cover rent costs 
paid direct to the claimant.
21 Further complexity may arise from how different departments and local authorities change 
eligibility for ‘passported’ benefits, such as free school meals, for in-work recipients of UC.
22 In 2010, the LSC was closed after the greater part of its £11.6 billion budget, for 16- to 
19-year-olds, was transferred to local education authorities. It was replaced by the Young 
People’s Learning Agency (YPLA), charged with helping local authorities work coherently 
together in providing for the 14–19 age bracket, and the Skills Funding Agency (SFA) was 
created to administer the flow of funding for skills to colleges and training providers. A 
separate National Apprenticeships Service was created with ‘end-to-end’ responsibility for 
the apprenticeships programme. In 2012, the YPLA was absorbed by the Education Funding 
Agency, which funds state-provided education for all children aged 3 to 16, and most young 
people aged 16 to 19.
23 This was formally called the Preferred Suppliers for the Employment Related Support 
Services Framework. The list of organisations included in the framework has since been 
removed from the DWP website and it is unclear whether providers will have to requalify for 
a revised framework agreement before bidding for the next WP contracts. 
24 Due to lower than expected recruitment, WP eligibility criteria for ESA claimants was 
changed to include those assessed as being capable of work within a year. This increased 
provider income from the flow of higher attachment fees but providers were poorly prepared 
to deliver services needed by, or secure outcomes for, a wider group with major employment 
barriers.
25 While many prime providers have been subject to performance improvement activity, 
especially for the hardest-to-place groups, only one contract has been terminated. This 
was held by Newcastle College Group, coincidentally the only public sector entity to act as a 
WP prime provider. Technically, this provider did meet minimum performance standards but 
because these were flawed the DWP used another contractual right to be able to ‘break’ the 
contract with NCG (NAO, 2014).
26 There is significant variation in the organisational size, capacity and population coverage of 
LEPs with some, such as Dorset, covering single county areas, while others cover large city 
regions and have sub-groups, advisory panels, and ‘task and finish’ groups reporting to their 
boards. The average number of LEP board members is 15, with board membership varying 
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between 48 and 9. About half are from the private and public sectors, although this varies, 
with over 70% private sector on one board and 60% public sector on another board (Pike, 
et al. 2013, p. 12). Four LEPs have female chairs and in total there are 92 female board 
members, some 15% of the total (Ward, 2014, p. 19). There is no data on ethnic composition. 
Only 20 LEPs have board members with some connection to the voluntary and community 
sector (NCVO, 2013).
27 Local authority leaders’ boards are voluntary associations of council leaders that were 
established as part of the previous government’s ‘Review of Sub-National Economic 
Development and Regeneration’, 2008. The Coalition Government abolished the boards’ 
statutory functions but indicated that the boards might continue as voluntary associations of 
council leaders.
28 This fund will incorporate the European Social Fund with other EU funding programmes, 
principally the European Regional Development Fund. The ESF supports Skills Funding 
Agency projects worth £874 million and other schemes run by the DWP and National 
Offender Management Service totalling £354.6 million.
29 Although central government accrues much of the benefit from increased economic growth, 
some of the deals include new ways for cities to share in future revenue growth. Newcastle 
and Gateshead, for example, will retain all growth in business rate income for 25 years 
from four development sites in which they invest. Greater Manchester will benefit from an 
‘Earnback’ model whereby £1.2 billion in upfront infrastructure investment will be repaid to 
the Combined Authority out of the proceeds of subsequent economic growth, which then is 
to be invested in further growth projects.
30 These initial pilots were, however, quickly overtaken by the CLG’s national Troubled Families 
programme delivered through local authorities. In a sign of inter-departmental competition, 
the DWP also decided to introduce a separate ESF-funded programme for Families with 
Multiple Problems, delivered by prime providers. Both the DWP and CLG programmes aim 
to support families by joining up the activities of local service providers and have elements of 
PbR rewarding providers, for example, for placing participants in work. The Public Accounts 
Committee criticised the ‘baffling decision’ by the departments to implement two separate 
programmes, which resulted in confusion and unnecessary duplication, and contributed to 
lower than expected performance (PAC, 2014b).
31 A further proposal concerned specialist technical expertise, and in 2013 the government 
announced the establishment of a Public Services Transformation Network to support new 
areas in taking a Community Budget approach. In June 2014, it was reported the network 
had commenced working with nine other areas and intends to enable as wide a roll-out of 
the approach across England as possible.
32 See www.newcastlefutures.co.uk
33 See www.agma.gov.uk/cms_media/files/121031_ws1_key_messages.pdf?static=1
34 Greater Manchester has commissioned two providers to deliver a co-financed programme 
targeted at ESA WP leavers. The model is adapted from Manchester’s Troubled Families 
programme, with key workers expected to better co-ordinate and sequence local services. 
Delivery commenced in March 2014.
35 The LEP estimates that up to £8 of every £10 spent on employment support funding in the 
city is spent on primarily DWP-controlled programmes designed and provided according 
to national guidelines. Many employment and skills programmes are also commissioned on 
different geographies and delivered through different supply systems, leading to a confused 
and confusing delivery system.
36 The shadow Minister for Work and Pensions has indicated that in English areas where 
combined authorities can demonstrate that they have the capacity, an incoming Labour 
Government would devolve WP commissioning. Funding would be agreed on a conditional 
basis, with combined authorities able to keep savings from delivery above a baseline, but 
responsible for the costs if their delivery falls short. While only a few areas would be able, 
or willing, to take on the risks of performance-based contracting, it is anticipated that over 
time most combined authorities would go on to commission provision in future contracting 
rounds.
37 The Centre for Social Justice (CSJ, 2013) and Policy Exchange propose that, apart from 
benefit administration and claimant profiling, all JCP employment services provision should 
be contracted out. Policy Exchange, for example, has proposed that benefit administration 
and claimant profiling be undertaken by a rebranded Citizen Support public service, while 
the employment support elements of JCP would be ‘mutualised’ (Miscampbell and Porte, 
2014). Private and public sector organisations, including LEPs and local authorities, would be 
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licensed to deliver welfare to work services, with funding channelled to the provider chosen 
by a claimant and paid on the basis of the outcomes achieved.
38 The federal Canada Social Transfer stipulates that a person cannot be refused social 
assistance because she or he has not lived a sufficient amount of time in a province or 
territory.
39 O’Leary, et al. (2011) provides a systematic assessment of the detailed programme findings 
from the evaluations undertaken by provinces and territories. Many of the original studies on 
different labour market services and programmes derive evidence from comparison group-
designed quasi-experimental evaluations. The studies tend to find at best ‘modest’ impacts 
on subsequent employment and earnings, analogous to findings from studies in other OECD 
countries (Card, et al., 2009).
40 Under the previous system, performance measurement was based on follow-up surveys 
of participants undertaken by the local administrative entities responsible for delivery, 
which provided an opportunity for areas to manipulate the results of performance 
measurement. The quarterly earnings records submitted by employers for UI tax and 
eligibility determination are not subject to any potential manipulation although there are 
some problems related to the accuracy and timeliness of the data and its use in performance 
management (O’Leary and Eberts, 2008).
41 The WIOA reforms will further extend the role of ‘sector based’ and ‘career pathway’ 
programmes, which are targeted at meeting the needs of employers while opening 
up better-paid jobs to poor people (Maguire, et al., 2010). The first such programmes 
were supported by charitable foundations, but they have since been more extensively 
supported through state governments and WIBs. The critical design feature is the role 
of the intermediary or partnership, which bridges the needs of employers and workers 
and organises resources and services. Some of the programmes have targeted industries 
characterised by low-quality jobs, such as home health care, home cleaning services and 
restaurant work, often with a focus on how to improve job quality. More commonly, sector-
based programmes develop pathways in higher-wage industries, such as hospital-based 
health care, manufacturing and information technology.
42 The reduction in public sector provision has partly been offset by facilitating new 
partnerships with private employment agencies. For example, since 2011 the newly 
unemployed have been required to attend specified locations to engage in ‘speed dating’ with 
private employment agencies within three weeks of claiming benefits.
43 The PES performance management system is designed also to deter the agency from 
‘parking’ harder-to-place clients until they transition out of insurance benefits to the 
tax-funded basic income support. A benefit duration measure means that the number 
of claimants exhausting their insurance entitlement has a negative impact on measured 
performance.
44 The German reforms provided greater safeguards for service delivery; the legislation on basic 
income required, for example, a broad ratio of job advisors to clients of 1:75 in the case of 
young people aged under 25, and 1:125 for older adults. The legal safeguard does not apply 
to conventional unemployment benefit recipients.
45 The Employment Related Services Association (ERSA), which represents primes and other 
employment services providers, has proposed a more cautious ‘evolutionary’ approach. It 
proposes the retention of national commissioning, using current or similar size CPA areas, to 
preserve the economies of scale of the current system. It suggests, however, the introduction 
of CPA level boards consisting of representatives of local government, LEPs and other 
organisations, alongside DWP officials, to help create better integration with local provision 
and to ensure a greater level of local accountability (ERSA, 2013).
46 When he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the Conservative Minister Greg Clark MP, 
who had previously helped negotiate the City Deals, suggested that he could see ‘no reason 
why, either individually or in partnership with one another’ the core cities ‘shouldn’t bid, on 
an equal basis to everyone else, for Work Programme contracts – even under their current 
regional structure’ – see www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2013/06/from-
gregclarkmp.html
47 In Canada, for example, there is some evidence that local implementers have used short-term 
employment programmes to help welfare claimants to qualify for centrally financed EI; in 
the Netherlands and the USA local government has often assisted welfare claimants to claim 
centrally funded disability benefits.
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